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# Forced migration, aid effectiveness, and the humanitarian–development nexus

The case of Germany's P4P programme

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**Abstract:** Bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation has been a contentious issue in academia and development practice for decades. Drawing on an evaluation of Germany's 'Partnership for Prospects' initiative, this paper argues that, whilst the supplement of 'peacebuilding' to the nexus (humanitarian–development–peacebuilding [HDP] nexus) brought an important context factor into the discussion in an environment of conflict, it is only of marginal help in a context of forced migration to neighbouring countries of a given conflict. For the context of host countries of refugees in a protracted crisis, it is more relevant that host countries show ownership and reliability in their policies to create long-term perspectives for refugees. These policies in turn need to be embedded in reliable rules (polity) and negotiation processes (politics) in host countries. Consequently, the paper suggests that a 'HD–Triple-P' nexus would take the necessary political dimension into account more adequately. However, it might also mark the boundary as to what development politics can achieve.

**Key words:** forced migration, conflict, development politics, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, refugees, HDP nexus

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## 1 Introduction

One of the most immediate consequences of war and other forms of violent conflict is the displacement and forced migration of millions of affected people.

According to the UNHCR, at the end of 2021, some 89.3 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, and other events seriously disturbing public order (UNHCR 2022). This translates into one in every 88 people on earth having been forced to flee (ibid.).

From a European perspective, ‘modern-day’ conflict-induced forced migration became most visible during the so-called ‘migrant crisis’ in 2015 because of the conflict in Syria, which saw some 1.3 million refugees come to the continent, and which stirred substantial political controversy in European countries (Barlai et al. 2017).<sup>1</sup>

This controversy over immigration into Europe, however, eclipsed the fact that only a very small share of refugees makes its way to Europe and other high-income countries. Instead, at some 83 per cent, the vast majority of refugees worldwide are hosted in low- and middle-income countries (UNHCR 2022).

The political, economic, and social challenges arising from dealing with such a massive inflow of foreign refugees or internally displaced people are, of course, disproportionately larger for developing countries than for rich nations. Besides providing immediate protection and assistance to affected individuals, especially in the case of protracted crises such as in Syria, host countries face a multitude of challenges to deal with the impact of this inflow in the medium to long run. These challenges range from the provision of permanent shelter and infrastructure to attenuating tensions between host communities and refugees, creating opportunities for refugees to earn income and integrate into the formal labour market and their children into formal education.

## 2 Managing the humanitarian–development nexus in the context of forced migration

For external actors such as bilateral donors, who seek to support both, refugees as well as host countries and communities, this translates into having to bridge the much-debated gap(s) between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation (see Figure 1).

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<sup>1</sup> Most recently, according to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency FRONTEX, some 5.3 million Ukrainians have entered the EU in the aftermath of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This, however, has generated much less political controversy in the EU than the so-called Syria migration crisis (<https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/5-3-million-ukrainians-have-entered-eu-since-the-beginning-of-invasion-HbXkUz>).

Figure 1: Two worlds—international humanitarian assistance and development cooperation

	<b>International Humanitarian Assistance</b>	<b>International Development Cooperation</b>
<i>Objectives</i>	- save lives - alleviate human suffering	- alleviate poverty - long-term social and economic development - good governance/rule of law
<i>Modus operandi</i>	- short-term <sup>a</sup> - individual & immediate - unconditional - implemented by IOs, NGOs, local contractors	- long-term - structural - selective/conditional
<i>Principles</i>	- humanitarian principles (e.g. humanity, independence, impartiality, neutrality)	- principles for aid effectiveness (e.g. national ownership, alignment with partner's strategies, harmonization among donors)
<i>Legal basis</i>	- international humanitarian law (e.g. Geneva Conventions)	- agreements with partner countries, binding under international law
<i>Actors</i>	- multilateral (e.g. UNHCR, WFP) - bilateral (e.g. Sida) - non-governmental (e.g. Oxfam, Care, Red Cross, Red Crescent Moon)	- multilateral (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF) - bilateral (Danida, Sida, USAID) - non-governmental (e.g. Action Aid, Christian Aid)

**Humanitarian – Development Gap**

Note: Note that this figure is an ideal-type juxtaposition reflecting the respective mandates of organizations, not their de facto work. <sup>a</sup>The ideal-typical characterization of international humanitarian assistance as “short-term” refers to its level of objectives. Even though humanitarian assistance is engaged continuously in protracted crises, traditionally it concentrates on short-term objectives (such as emergency life-saving). Source: Authors' own

Source: Figure 2 in Kocks et al. (2018: 22), reproduced under the Creative Commons license CC BY 4.0.

The challenge of bridging the gap between humanitarian aid and development cooperation has been a contentious issue in academia and development practice at least since the mid-1980s (Medinilla et al. 2019), when practitioners found that humanitarian and development activities were not well aligned during food crises in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

The ensuing debate on how to link these two realms produced a number of prominent reports and conceptual frameworks on how to better progress from short-term relief to longer-term development cooperation. Among these are the EU-Commission's report *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development* (EU Commission 1996) and the coinage of the term ‘humanitarian–development nexus’ (HD nexus) in the context of the 2016 UN World Humanitarian Summit to describe a ‘new way of working’ aimed at transcending this humanitarian–development divide.<sup>3</sup>


<sup>2</sup> The need to link relief and development was initially mentioned—by practitioners—in analyses of food crises affecting African countries in the 1980s (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994: 3).

<sup>3</sup> For a general overview of conceptual literature, see Kocks et al. (2018: 16–20).

However, it was soon recognized that as humanitarian needs (and thus the need to manage the HD nexus) in the majority of cases are driven by conflicts,<sup>4</sup> managing the nexus had to take into account the context that caused the humanitarian crisis in the first place. Particularly so, as aid in conflict situations can have adverse effects, disrupt existing power dynamics, be instrumentalized to achieve political gains, or set free resources to sustain the conflict (Lange and Quinn 2003, quoted in Medinilla et al. 2019).

Eventually, therefore, ‘peace’ was added as a third dimension to this nexus, making it the humanitarian–development–peace (or HDP) nexus (see Figure 2). This ‘triple nexus’ including security, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding<sup>5</sup> nowadays focuses on ongoing structural changes for a more coherent planning and financing of humanitarian aid, development assistance, and the promotion of peace (Oxfam 2019).<sup>6</sup>

Figure 2: The humanitarian–development–peace nexus



Source: Figure 1 in Medinilla et al. (2019: 2), reused with permission.

The ‘triple nexus’ approach asks all relevant actors (i.e. humanitarian, development, and diplomatic actors) to work together to address the root causes of vulnerability, fragility, and conflict, and to build resilience (Jones and Mazzara 2018, quoted in Medinilla et al. 2019).

<sup>4</sup> Conflicts drive 80% of all humanitarian needs (World Bank 2018, quoted in Medinilla et al. 2019).

<sup>5</sup> In fact, there is little agreement between implementing organizations on the understanding and implementation of the peace component of the HDP nexus (BMZ 2021).

<sup>6</sup> Even though the importance of peace for long-term developments is undisputed, the understanding of what ‘peacebuilding’ actually entails varies amongst protagonists of these debates (BMZ 2021: 14).

There is now a fairly general consensus in the donor community that making aid effective in post-conflict and similar fragile contexts hinges on how well this HDP nexus is managed. The only open question would thus seem to be how to best do this in practice (Kocks et al. 2018: 25).

However, despite this consensus and although the debate on how to manage this HD(P) nexus has been going on for decades, to date it remains very much at a conceptual level with surprisingly scarce empirical work on what works and what does not in bridging the humanitarian–development gap, in particular in situations of forced-migration crises.

A recent systematic literature review of extant conceptual and empirical work on how to effectively link humanitarian and development responses to forced-migration crises by Kocks et al. (2018), explores the most prominent concepts of the humanitarian–development nexus.<sup>7</sup> In an attempt to map empirical studies in the context of the Syria crisis and their findings on the HD nexus against these conceptual considerations, Kocks et al. (2018) diagnose a ‘gulf between conceptual and empirical literature [...]’ and find that existing empirical studies do not attempt to ‘explore in-depth questions’ and ‘provide almost no evidence on intended (and unintended) outcomes of humanitarian-development linkage in response to the Syria crisis’ (Kocks et al. 2018: 126).

This lack of empirical evidence on the effects of the (missing) link between humanitarian and development assistance means that—from an aid effectiveness point of view—very little is known about how to effectively support developing countries in dealing in the medium to long term with protracted crises. A recent evaluation of Germany’s ‘Partnership for Prospects’ (P4P) initiative in the Middle East (Roxin et al. 2021) contributes to filling this evidence gap exemplified by the forced migration crisis of Syria.

The inclusion of ‘peace’ in the nexus discussion stems from ongoing debates ever after the UN World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016. However, it has hitherto not created much more than a general consensus on the need of peaceful conditions for a successful nexus and hence, the inclusion of different other criteria and stakeholders. Whether this first and foremost hinges on conflict sensitivity and a stronger focus on social cohesion and/or is to do with a cooperation of the known actors with peace or even security actors, is still a bone of contention (VOICE 2019; Oxfam 2019; Development Initiatives 2019).<sup>8</sup>

Based on the findings of this evaluation, this paper argues that the focus on the HDP nexus as a seemingly sufficient condition to ensure aid effectiveness in post-conflict and other fragile situations may be misplaced, and a more encompassing ‘third leg’ of the HD nexus is required to effectively bridge the humanitarian–development divide in such contexts.

### **3 The case of Germany’s P4P programme in neighbouring countries of Syria**

The P4P is an ambitious attempt to bridge the humanitarian–development gap in countries neighbouring Syria. Initiated in 2016 in the context of the ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’

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<sup>7</sup> These are: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD); Resilience; The Whole of Government Approach (WoG); Early Recovery; Connectedness. Valuable general conceptual considerations can also be found at Hinds (2015), Mosel and Levine (2014), Otto and Weingärtner (2013), Steets (2011), White and Cliff (2000), and OCHA et al. (2015).

<sup>8</sup> The literature is not yet very elaborate on this topic, and the discussions often times evolve over the usual challenges of the independence of humanitarian actors vis-à-vis peacebuilding actors and the challenge of reconciling bottom-up-approaches and local initiatives with diplomacy and peacebuilding interventions.

conference held in London that year, its initial aim was to help creating temporary employment for refugees and vulnerable people in host communities in large numbers by means of cash-for-work interventions (CfW), building and maintaining public infrastructure such as schools, basic roads, and parks. A second branch of the programme paid teachers' salaries for the schooling of Syrian refugee children (Roxin et al. 2021: xiv).

After 2018, P4P increasingly incorporated additional training measures for CfW participants as well as the organization of social events for refugees and the local population, aimed at facilitating the target group's integration in the formal labour market and at strengthening social cohesion in host communities. The idea was thus to gradually transition from short-term measures in the acute crisis situation to catalysing longer-term, structural change and development (Roxin et al. 2021: 6).

The P4P initiative has also been coherent with and well embedded into the *Regional Refugee Resilience Plans* (3RPs) in response to the Syria crisis. The 3RPs epitomize international actors' commitment to building bridges between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in the Middle East. They underline the necessity of profound changes when dealing with humanitarian crises, particularly in Syria.<sup>9</sup>

In short, Germany's P4P programme increasingly tried to implement the HD nexus and link short-term relief efforts with longer-term structural outcomes at individual and community levels based on a 'state-of-the-art' reading of the HD (and at a later stage HDP) concept.

The 2021 evaluation of the P4P programme was aimed at understanding how effective Germany's development cooperation immediate crisis support was and how effectively it is managing the transition from these short-term interventions to a more structured support with a medium- to long-term perspective.

In this context, the evaluation had to address a number of complexity challenges:

1. The need to reconcile answering the 'nexus question' with the stakeholder interest of one particular division within the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), mainly geared towards immediate effects. This was especially difficult due to a premature start of the programme in an emergency situation and a strong political backing for immediate action. Thus, stakeholders tended to eschew questions of sustainability and impact in the course of the evaluation.
2. Due to the quick start of the programme, there was no theory of change (ToC) and no baseline data. Additionally, the programme evolved continuously over time in its character, and the environment kept on changing. All of this made the attempt to measure outcomes challenging.
3. The country context (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Northern Iraq) differed a lot—the will to integrate refugees versus a mere guest status in host countries, the diverse conflict involvement of host countries, and very diverse portfolios of German Development Cooperation made conclusions for the overall programme difficult.

In the end, a method-integrated design was chosen to address these challenges and answer causal as well as non-causal questions. While outcomes and impacts of the programme were mainly addressed with causal contributions, broader conclusions on the nexus were drawn by means of plausibility. The design aimed at examining how, why, and in which context different measures are

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<sup>9</sup> UNHCR (2016). See, e.g., <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/52586>.

effective or ineffective (Effectiveness, Sustainability, and Impact) and attempted to embed them into the context at hand (Relevance and Coherence).

The evaluation follows a design based on data and method triangulation that was executed in three different steps:

1. The reconstruction of a theory of change for the P4P.
2. A theory-testing step based on qualitative data-gathering methods on on-site visits.
3. A rigorous impact-measuring step based on two panel surveys of refugees and vulnerable households in Jordan and Turkey.

The evaluation analysed (i) infrastructural measures targeted to mitigate the pressure on host communities and (ii) individual changes of attitudes and behaviour of refugees and vulnerable groups of host communities over time. The first was mainly done by on-site visits and the attempt to capture all relevant perspectives (interviews, focus group discussions, participatory methods) on the respective infrastructural changes. The latter was first prepared with preliminary qualitative interviews aimed at determining adequate questions to ask vulnerable people. It was then executed by face-to-face interviews with a large number of participants in the P4P programme and control groups.

Although the main objective of the programme was economic (temporary employment), the evaluation sought to find changes on different levels in order to reflect a potentially richer spectrum of life: material, social, cognitive, and psychological/mental changes.<sup>10</sup> Two large-N panel surveys in Jordan and Turkey (N>2600) allowed for a representative basis for the evaluation. In both countries the surveys included all participants of P4P at the time. Given the background of forced migration, the return rate was lower than in surveys of a less volatile context. However, the panel mortality of participants (82 per cent in Jordan and 78 per cent in Turkey could be traced) and control group (70 and 59 per cent were traced) was lower than expected and provided a solid foundation for the analysis.

This approach permitted causal inferences with regard to programme outcomes for participants via qualitative-interpretive methods of context variables and mechanisms in the first and second phases, and quasi-experimental methods in the final phase. Both allowed for a theory testing of the ToC in terms of intended and unintended outcomes as well as understanding underlying causal mechanisms.

However, the results on whether and why the P4P measures produce outcomes for vulnerable refugees and hosts do not serve as a direct measure of the programme's contribution to the HD(P) nexus. Instead, the interpretation whether the P4P was able to bridge (some of) the identified gaps was based on qualitative interviews with experts, context analyses in the neighbouring countries of Syria, and document analyses.

#### **4 Evaluation findings**

The evaluation finds that the P4P programme to a large extent did not succeed in bridging the HD divide. While the programme was effective in temporarily alleviating the precarious situation of

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
<sup>10</sup> This leans on conceptual literature on empowerment (Chen and Mahmud 1995) and the 'capability approach' of Sen (1999).



refugees and other vulnerable households, it failed to produce any structural economic improvements, both at the individual and host communities' levels, or even of society as a whole.

On the one hand, the evaluation finds that the P4P's CfW interventions had positive immediate effects on household incomes. These helped to temporarily alleviate the precarious situation of participating refugees and vulnerable households in host communities, as the temporary increase in household income was used by beneficiaries to meet basic needs, with especially substantial effects for poorer households and for women.<sup>11</sup>

Figure 3: Development of household income of female and male vulnerable host population and refugees




Source: Roxin et al. (2021: 62).

<sup>11</sup> The absolute change (i.e. excluding the control group) in the average household income of female participants is 67 JD (P value 0.00), which is 34 JD (P value 0.02) higher than that of male participants. Controlling for period effects by including the change for the weighted control group over time, the average effect of participation for female participants is 71 JD (P value 0.00) and is 26 JD above that of males (P value 0.18).

Additionally, the findings on the social and psychological level are surprisingly positive: Working together in CfW measures and tangible outcomes of works such as garbage collection and local infrastructure have increased trust between participating refugees and local households and impacted positively on social cohesion in host communities. Figure 4 shows the levels of trust at the beginning of the intervention and three months after the intervention.

Particularly striking are the results in Turkey. Here, in a context of continuously increasing social tensions between refugees and hosts in 2019, the number of refugees trusting hosts has remained largely stable. And, more importantly, the number of Turks trusting Syrians has significantly decreased less amongst participants than in the control group.<sup>12</sup> While mistrust of participants was clearly lower towards Syrians than in the control group at the midline already, the cohesive effects of the programme showed even clearer at the endline: Roughly half of the Turkish participants mistrust Syrians, while in the control group it is more than 80 per cent. This is a medium- to long-term positive effect that goes beyond the expectations of the programme.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 4: Mutual trust between hosts and refugees



Source: Roxin et al. (2021: 87).


<sup>12</sup> The positive effect in Turkey is statistically significant at the 10 percent level ( $p=0,078$ ).

<sup>13</sup> There is also evidence of other important psycho-social effects such as a higher self-esteem of refugees after the programme (Roxin et al. 2021: xvi).

On the other hand, however, the evaluation finds very little evidence that the P4P programme successfully bridged the economic gap from short-term temporary income effects to sustained positive outcomes at individual or community levels.

Despite efforts by the programme to combine cash-for-work with training and other support measures (‘CfW+’) to help integrate participants into the formal labour market, the evaluation finds no evidence that participation in CfW measures increases participation in the formal labour market afterwards (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Effects of CfW on employment in the formal labour market of participants in the programme



Source: Roxin et al. (2021: 79).

Hence, the main objective of bridging the economic gap between short-term employment and sustained positive economic effects was clearly missed.

Furthermore, there remain serious doubts as to the sustainability and long-term positive economic effects of the constructed infrastructure.

On the one hand, the construction and use of public infrastructure (parks, roads, waste, and recycling infrastructure) has relatively quickly eased the pressure on local infrastructure, and the attitudes of hosts towards refugees have temporarily improved not least due to this. However, on the other hand, most of the infrastructure relies on ongoing financial support of donors and the commitment of local administration regularly ends when they are asked to contribute themselves. Likewise, host communities’ administrations and national ministries expect donors to continuously support them with financial and technical assistance through CfW.

In sum, with regard to how well Germany’s P4P programme manages to bridge the gap between the mentioned short-term measures and structural support for host countries and communities, the evaluation finds that the activities appear to be relatively successful in mitigating social tensions. However, it has been mostly ineffective in terms of mainly intended structural and longer-term outcomes on the economic level. Despite substantial conceptual and operational efforts, P4P was not able to produce lasting effects on income generation of refugees or foster the creation of formal employment or other long-term perspectives for refugees.

## 5 Implications for the triple-nexus debate

We selected the evaluation of Germany's P4P programme as a case for the argument made here because, beyond the findings summarized above, it provides a rich source of context information and offers interpretations for its findings which in turn have important implications for the triple-nexus debate in contexts of protracted refugee crises.

The evaluation observes that—realizing that the intervention was largely falling short of its objective to bridge the HD divide—programme managers worked towards extending the approach by measures such as vocational training and capacity development for the host countries' administrations dealing with refugees (Roxin et al. 2021: xix). However, the evaluation concludes that these measures were prone to be largely unsuccessful as well, because—even more than the CfW measures—they required context conditions that were not in place and arguably beyond external donors' influence.

The example of P4P shows how much the effectiveness of aid measures in forced migration crises depends on conditions in the given political context of host countries. Temporary effects can be achieved more easily by adequately adapted planning and coordination. Whether contributions are made to the lasting creation of life prospects for the large number of Syrian refugees, however, depends to a great extent on creating national framework conditions which enable integration and securing continued high inputs of international support.

Both presuppose the political will of both host countries and donors to extend help to the refugees for the long term, and to create genuine life prospects for them outside of Syria. However, the Syrian context also shows that a necessary agreement between donors and host countries as to migration policies hardly exists, and this is exacerbated by the fact that development actors have relatively little influence on national migration politics.

The Jordanian government for example still considers Syrian refugees as 'temporary guests', which makes the long-term integration of Syrians more difficult. The Turkish government on the other hand has been formally offering Syrian refugees a long-term integration perspective and has been rewarded by the EU and especially the German government with funds and technical assistance.<sup>14</sup> However, Turkey has been using the misery of Syrian refugees and the dependence of EU member states on Turkish support for national politics many times and expelled refugees (to Greece) or at least threatened to deport them (to a yet to be erected security corridor on Syrian territory).

This illustrates that ownership and reliability of host countries are of utmost importance in order to create long-term perspectives for refugees, and at the same time they are hard to achieve, since the integration of refugees is often times highly contested territory, politically. This concerns all three dimensions of the political realm: *polity*, *policy*, and *politics*. Institutional and constitutional order and reliable processes (*polity*) are necessary to guarantee a minimal degree of reliability of partner countries. Migration (and related) *policies* can be seen as a materialization of ownership of


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<sup>14</sup> The EU–Turkey agreement consists of the payment of 6 billion euros in two tranches from 2016 to 2020 and has recently been extended (see ECA 2018).

partner countries. And *politics* as societal negotiations and processes to deal with conflict and reach consensus guarantee a transparent form of dealing with the integration (see Figure 6).<sup>15</sup>

Obviously, peacebuilding measures as the third component of the triple nexus only partially address these challenges. Whilst peace in Syria would certainly structure and positively influence the long-term perspectives of many Syrian refugees in host countries, the challenge for effective development assistance for refugees in the neighbouring countries of Syria is still a different matter. Here, the necessary framework conditions for a successful transformation of short-term to longer-term outcomes first and foremost depend on host governments' and societies' sustained ownership for the integration of refugees.

Figure 6: The humanitarian–development–Triple-P nexus



Source: authors' illustration based on Medinilla et al. (2019); adapted with permission.

## 6 Conclusion

The creation of effective links between humanitarian and development actors does not seem to be sufficient to reach the desired outcomes in the context of forced migration. The more recent debate on the triple nexus is addressing the challenge of sufficient conditions for effective development cooperation in a given conflict context only partially. Whilst the supplement of 'peacebuilding' brought an important context factor into the discussion in an environment of conflict, it is only of marginal help in a context of forced migration to neighbouring countries of a given conflict. While peacebuilding is de facto an important prerequisite for longer-term perspectives of refugees who remain in their home region, for the context of host countries of refugees in a protracted crisis it is not the most relevant aspect and lies beyond the scope of what

<sup>15</sup> A democratic governance obviously helps to meet these requirements, but is not necessarily needed, since reliable and transparent decisions can also be produced in autocratic governments. However, in this case it is likely that the level of *politics* is hampered to a certain degree.

actors can do on the ground. This is not only due to the difficulties of reaching a ‘positive peace’<sup>16</sup> with outside interventions, but also because of other more pressing challenges neighbouring states face.

This means that for contexts such as the ‘refugee crisis’ in the neighbouring states of Syria, a different shape of the nexus should be considered. We suggest that a ‘HD–Triple-P nexus’ would take the political dimension into account more adequately. Admittedly, success in this political dimension is hard to achieve since it frequently involves topics of national sovereignty. Therefore, it might first and foremost imply that the gap is even larger than commonly discussed. It nevertheless serves to put the main challenges for the effectiveness of development politics on the radar.

While a situation where the urgent does not leave room for the important would not appear overly surprising to most observers in a context such as the Syria crisis, the further analysis of the evaluation suggests a deeper problem with the HD nexus as a concept to achieve aid effectiveness in post-conflict and other fragile contexts: namely that while the effective management of the HD(P) nexus in order to bridge the much-discussed humanitarian–development gap may form a necessary condition, it is by no means a sufficient condition to ensure development cooperation can fulfil its purpose in these contexts. This conclusion is corroborated by other recent work in Iraq (Hartmann et al. 2022), which observes similar limitations to the effectiveness of aid in a fragile post-conflict context.

This would suggest that much of the conceptual discussion on how to achieve aid effectiveness in post-conflict and other crisis situations of the past years may focus too much on questions about internal coordination and coherence on the donor side of the aid relation and much too little about necessary and sufficient context conditions. This also risks blurring the fact that effective development cooperation in the sense of truly contributing to transformational change and socio-economic development in these contexts can sometimes simply not be achieved.

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<sup>16</sup> The term ‘positive peace’ goes back to Johan Galtung and means to fight the root causes of conflict and (re)establish functioning systems on the ground in order to achieve a lasting peace and not only a pause of conflicts. Compare for an adaptation in development politics: World Bank (2020).

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