

# Who Cares? European Public Opinion on Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality\*

 THILO BODENSTEIN<sup>1</sup> and JÖRG FAUST<sup>2</sup>
<sup>1</sup>Central European University <sup>2</sup>German Institute for Development Evaluation - DEval

## Abstract

We provide evidence on the individual and country-level determinants of citizens' support for political conditionality in foreign aid, using novel survey data for 27 European countries. Based on the welfare state literature and existing public opinion research in foreign aid, we expect citizens with more rightist political orientations as well as those who do not perceive their own state apparatus to function in a meritocratic way to be more likely to support political conditionality. Our multi-level analysis supports these hypotheses in general, but also shows that the effect of political orientations on support for political conditionality in foreign aid is limited to traditional EU donor countries, where the left/right-cleavage has been dominant in politics.

**Keywords:** Public Opinion; Foreign Aid; Foreign Policy; Political Conditionality; Welfare State; European Politics

## 1. Introduction

Public opinion research on foreign aid has examined the general disposition of populations with regard to the provision of foreign aid (Paxton and Knack, 2012), citizens' varying preferences for multilateral aid (Milner, 2006) and the broader public's concerns about corruption in recipient countries as a potential cause of the waste of aid resources (Bauhr *et al.*, 2013). Recent studies have also investigated the individual determinants of citizen support for external democracy promotion (Brancati, 2014; Faust and Garcia, 2014). However, there has thus far been no systematic inquiry into the individual determinants of support for various components of foreign aid policies – such as the amount of aid and whether aid should be tied to conditionality – among European citizens. Seminal contributions on public support for foreign aid are Milner and Tingley (2013) and Paxton and Knack (2012). Milner and Tingley (2013) cite studies on individual preferences for foreign aid that are based on US data. Paxton and Knack (2012) cover 12 pre-accession EU Member States, but not all current EU Member States. McEvoy (2016) shows that public support of the EU is determined by political efficacy – whether the interests of voters are taken into account or not. For instance, the stark differences in the development of Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets among EU Member States may to some extent be traced back to differences in public opinion. The picture for the EU and its Member States is nuanced. In 2015, for instance,

[Correction added on 21 November 2023, after first online publication: The copyright has been changed.]

\*The authors would like to thank Katharina Michaelowa, Bernhard Reinsberg for providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, as well as the anonymous JCMS reviewers. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. Moreover, the findings presented in this article do not represent findings from an evaluation of the German Institute for Development Evaluation.

net ODA of EU institutions has slightly decreased, while at the same time, more aid has been channelled through trust funds (Michaelowa *et al.*, 2016). Some EU Member States such as Germany and Austria have significantly increased their budgets, but mainly due to an increase of in-donor costs for refugees. Net increases independent of refugee costs took place in Poland and Slovakia, but on balance net ODA stood constant or even decreased for most EU Member States (Heinrich *et al.*, 2016) and the EU institutions.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the ability of the EU to act collectively in terms of development aid (*cf.* Bodenstein *et al.*, 2016) may be constrained by European public opinion, as demands by national constituencies may diverge. In this study, we seek to explore the determinants of individual preferences for two important components of ODA – support for foreign aid and support for conditionality – among EU citizens.

Since the end of the Cold War, conditioning the allocation of foreign aid on political criteria such as the level of democracy or human-rights standards has become a common practice among Western donor governments, including the European Union (Börzel and Hackenesch, 2013). Recent evidence suggests that foreign aid to autocratic countries not only fosters patronage and clientelism (Hodler and Raschky, 2014), but also tends to stabilize authoritarian structures (Bader and Faust, 2014; Kono *et al.*, 2015; Morrison, 2009). Consequently, democratic governance in particular is perceived as increasing the socioeconomic benefits of foreign aid, as more democratic governments tend to spend more foreign aid resources on the provision of development-enhancing public goods (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Kosack, 2003).<sup>2</sup>

Over the past two decades, a growing body of literature has addressed questions of aid allocation, investigating the types of developing countries that receive more foreign aid and examining whether political institutions in recipient countries serve as criteria for aid selectivity (Clist, 2011; Molenars *et al.*, 2015). Political conditionality, however, has not been consistently applied, and many authoritarian countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Rwanda and Ethiopia still receive large sums of development assistance. There are several reasons behind this inconsistency in the use of political conditionality. Donor governments' use of political conditionality is driven in part by their domestic concerns regarding the broader public's reaction to highly visible human-rights violations, coups or cases of corruption. In line with the liberal strand of foreign policy analysis (Moravcsik, 1997), the allocation of foreign aid and the degree of conditionality would therefore not only be a function of developmental concerns or the pursuit of national economic and security interests, but also a response to the interests of a donor government's core constituencies. The literature frequently notes that the use of political conditionality and aid sanctions is at least in part driven by donor governments' concerns about potential criticism from human-rights organizations, parliamentarians and ultimately the broader public for neglecting human rights and democracy issues in their foreign aid policies (Apodaca and Stohl, 1999).

But for developmental reasons, donor countries might feel obligated to distribute large shares of foreign aid to the poorest countries, which are often also among those with the

<sup>1</sup> OECD development aid in 2015 continues to grow because of costs for in-donor refugees (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf>; accessed 21 April 2016).

<sup>2</sup> The evidence that the effectiveness of foreign aid is conditioned by the level of democratic governance or more broadly by 'good' political institutions (Burnside and Dollar, 2004) in recipient countries is in line with insights from the institutional turn in the social sciences that has identified political institutions in general and democracy in particular as crucial determinants of economic development (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2002; Keefer *et al.*, 2011; Lake and Baum, 2001; Olson, 1993).

most illiberal political institutions. The overarching security concerns, trade interests, colonial ties and geostrategic interests of donor governments can also distort an allocation formula guided only by developmental concerns such as the neediness of the population or the quality of political institutions (Alesina and Weder, 2002). The disbursement pressure within aid bureaucracies also can work against more selective aid allocation in favour of democracy and human-rights standards (Svensson, 2003). As there are numerous conflicting objectives regarding aid allocation,<sup>3</sup> donor governments are faced with the dilemma of disbursing foreign aid and applying strict *ex-ante* or *ex-post* conditionality. In order to understand the future of foreign aid policy of the EU and its Member States it is thus important to analyze public demand for foreign aid and conditionality by the European constituencies.

Against this background, this article contributes to the research by providing an analysis of the 2011 Eurobarometer survey data from 27 European countries. More specifically, we investigate the individual-level determinants of two dependent variables: Support for foreign aid and support for political conditionality attached to foreign aid. Our theoretical expectations build on the literature on public opinion in the field of foreign aid (see, for example, Paxton and Knack, 2012), as well as on research that has investigated citizens' attitudes toward redistributive policies in Western welfare states (see, for example, Korpi and Palme, 1998). Although our data show broad support for political conditionality and foreign aid among EU citizens, our econometric analysis reveals several individual-level effects that explain the remaining variation among the European public. The analysis of support for foreign aid indicates that EU citizens with less right-wing tendencies are more likely to be in favour of foreign aid. We argue that EU citizens' support for political conditionality is significantly influenced by the corruption level respondents associate with their own state apparatus. Moreover, such support is also related to political orientation: people on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to support political conditionality.

In addition, we show that political preferences and the perception of corruption have different effects on preferences for foreign aid and conditionality between the subsamples of traditional and 'new EU donor states'.<sup>4</sup> We split our sample into traditional and new EU donor states, because the new states had no foreign aid policies prior to their EU membership; creation of a foreign aid policy was part of the EU-imposed membership conditionality (Lightfoot, 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014).

Our analysis contributes to several areas of the literature. It adds to research on EU public opinion regarding foreign policy issues (see Faust and Garcia, 2014; Hooghe, 2003; Schoen, 2008), shedding light on the preferences of EU citizens in the policy area of foreign aid and conditionality contributing to a better understanding of the domestic political economy of foreign aid provision and support for political conditionality. In accordance with other recent research on the importance of a donor government's ideological position for how aid is distributed (see Faust and Koch, 2014; Tingley, 2010), our results show a similar pattern of influence with regard to public opinion in terms of aid distribution in traditional EU donor countries as opposed to new EU donor countries. Our results also speak to the problem of convergence, coherence and collective action in EU development policy making

<sup>3</sup> There is an abundant amount of aid allocation literature supporting this argument (Buono de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Dreher *et al.*, 2009; Lundsgaarde *et al.*, 2007; Milner and Tingley, 2013; Noël and Thérien, 1995; Thérien and Noël, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> The new EU donor countries are: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

(Bodenstein *et al.*, 2016; Orbie and Carbone 2016), as they show substantial differences in public opinion between traditional and new EU donor states.

The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief review of the literature and present our theoretical arguments regarding the determinants of citizens' support for foreign aid and political conditionality. We subsequently present our data, define dependent and independent variables and describe the results of our inquiry. After discussing these results, the final section provides a summary of our analysis and suggestions for further avenues of research.

## 2. Preferences for International Redistribution and Conditionality

Several studies report that the political left/right cleavage is an important individual-level determinant of foreign aid preferences. For instance, EU citizens' support for democracy promotion is determined by political orientation (Faust and Garcia, 2014). Paxton and Knack (2012) find that right-wing political positions correlate with a lower level of support for foreign aid. Targeting foreign aid to poor countries is preferred by right-wing governments, as it reduces the overall amount of foreign aid (Bodenstein and Kemmerling, 2015). Conversely, left-wing policy-makers tend to be more lax with regard to political conditionality because this allows them to realize their preference for greater aid generosity and to implement a more universalist principle of solidarity by broadening the portfolio of aid-receiving countries. The parallels between welfare state policies and foreign aid have also been highlighted by Brech and Potrafke (2014), who argue that left-wing governments are more generous in foreign aid policy than right-wing governments.

On the individual level the causal connections between political and foreign aid preferences can be explained through several potential mechanisms. Political attitudes serve as information shortcuts for complex issues such as foreign aid (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), especially opinions on the causes of individual poverty (Paxton and Knack, 2012), right-wing beliefs about the role of individual effort in determining income levels (Piketty, 1995) and attitudes toward redistributive welfare systems (Feldman, 1983). Milner and Tingley (2013) stress the ideological dimension regarding individual foreign aid preferences and argue that conservative voters are concerned about foreign aid serving as a government intervention in the international marketplace. Based on the insights of the scholarly literature on the effects of political left/right attitudes, we formulate our first hypothesis with respect to preferences on foreign aid as follows:

*H1 : Citizens will be less likely to support foreign aid as their political orientation moves toward the right side of the political spectrum.*

Individual preferences for foreign aid may also be shaped by the domestic distributional consequences of foreign aid. Several authors have observed that donor governments distribute foreign aid in order to boost their exports to recipient countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Barthel *et al.*, 2014; Younas, 2008). The alignment of export interests and the foreign aid policies of donor governments could be attributable to economic interest groups (McLean, 2015), although voters may actually not be aware of such a link. However, based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Milner and Tingley (2011) argue that foreign aid has an impact on the international terms of trade. Because

donor countries primarily export capital-intensive goods to recipient countries, voters who own more capital will benefit and should consequently favour more foreign aid. This leads us to our second hypothesis.

*H2 : Respondents who are endowed with more human capital are more in favour of foreign aid than respondents with a low human capital endowment.*

Thus far, survey research has not explicitly modelled the effect of political positions on individual attitudes toward political conditionality in foreign aid. Conditioning foreign aid to political criteria, however, is high on the agenda of political decision-makers in the fields of foreign policy and development assistance. The first-generation concept of political conditionality during the 1990s entailed pressure from donor countries when conditions were not met by recipient governments, but views have changed since the turn of the millennium. Post-2000 political conditionality has become more complex and now refers to both sanctions and rewards for achieving governance and human rights standards (Molenaers *et al.*, 2015). The EU's governance incentive tranche and reformed budget-support policy also illustrates how policy-makers have tried to develop aid allocation schemes that reward political regimes in developing countries that feature more democratic institutions, less corruption and greater respect for human rights while simultaneously attempting to restrict the fungibility of foreign aid (*cf.* Birchler *et al.*, 2016; Boone, 1996; Reinsberg, 2015).

Conditionality can be *ex-ante* or *ex-post*. *Ex-ante* conditionality implies the fulfilment of certain criteria before applying policy measures or contract ratification and is also called aid selectivity in the area of foreign aid policy. *Ex-post* conditionality acts as an incentive to reach certain levels of performance or goals. Both types of conditionality can be either positive or negative (Koch, 2015). In the area of EU foreign aid policy *ex-post* conditionality has been the most frequent type (Koch, 2015). An example for positive *ex-post* conditionality is the EU's Governance Incentive Tranche (GIT) established in 2006 which offers a top-up of 30 per cent to ACP countries based on the quality of their prior established Governance Action Plans (Del Biondo and Orbie, 2014). Negative *ex-post* conditionality is also used in the 'essential elements clause' which allows the EU to suspend aid. By contrast, the use of positive or negative *ex-ante* conditionality by the EU in foreign aid is rare (Koch, 2015).

Highly visible cases of corruption, human-rights violations and democratic decay have often provoked a reduction in or even the complete suspension of aid flows. But empirical studies have come to nuanced conclusions about the effectiveness of second-generation political conditionality. The impact of democratic aid, for instance, depends on the domestic context of recipient countries (Dietrich and Wright, 2015), which proves that political conditionality does not necessarily work as a lever for political change. Also, various aid instruments seem to have only little impact on incremental changes in recipient countries (Grindle, 2011; Molenaers *et al.*, 2015).

One reason is that the use of various types of political conditionality has not been consistent across donor governments over time (Clist, 2011). This inconsistency arises from the fact that promoting democracy and human rights and sanctioning illiberal regimes are not the only functions of aid provision. In fact, numerous conflicting objectives compete in aid allocation (*cf.* Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Dreher *et al.*, 2009;

Milner and Tingley, 2013; Noël and Thérien, 1995; Thérien and Noël, 2000). Moreover, aligning preferences of donor and recipient governments with regards to *ex-post* conditionalities has been difficult (*cf.* Grimm and Leininger, 2012).

But granting foreign aid to illiberal regimes and ignoring human-rights violations carries a risk for donor governments, as these actions render them vulnerable to attacks from human-rights activists and domestic parliamentarians who will have to explain to their constituencies why the taxpayers' money is being used to prop up repressive dictatorships or ends up lining the pockets of corrupt elites in illiberal regimes. Accordingly, the use of political conditionality is at least in part a response to potential criticism from domestic actors and therefore falls into the realm of domestic politics and public opinion in donor countries (Fisher, 2015). Expecting domestic audiences to have a significant impact on donor governments' use of political conditionality does not require the debatable assumption that voters actually know whether political conditionality works or not; it suffices to assume that voters believe in the effectiveness of such conditionality when they form their individual preferences.

Likewise, it is unrealistic to assume that all voters will have the same preferences with regard to how foreign aid should be delivered. For instance, recent case-study evidence on the suspension of budget support has pointed to the fact that donor governments often respond differently to corruption scandals and human-rights violations (see Bauhr *et al.*, 2013; Molenaers, 2012). The ideological nature of the donor government is a significant determinant for this divergent application of political conditionality in the same recipient-country setting. Noël and Thérien (1995), for instance, argue that the structure of a country's foreign aid policy reflects its domestic structures. In this sense, governments that favour targeting and means-testing in domestic redistribution can also be expected to apply a similar approach in foreign aid, emphasizing the use of conditionality more than others.

Citizens perceive a trade-off between poverty alleviation in developing countries and poverty alleviation at home (Henson and Lindstrom, 2013), and self-interested attitudes also seem to reduce concern regarding foreign aid (Van Heerde and Hudson, 2010). Along these lines, Tingley (2010) suggests a partisan effect, showing that focusing foreign aid on poor countries is the preferred choice of right-wing governments. This is paralleled by insights from the welfare state literature, whereby citizens with more right-wing political orientations are more sceptical with regard to redistributive policies in general preferring targeted social policies for reasons of efficiency and in order to restrict the overall magnitude of redistribution (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Thus, we do not expect all voters to be in favour of conditionality, but mainly those who are more critical towards redistributive politics, which are typically right-wing voters. In a similar vein, Faust and Koch (2014) have identified a partisan effect on the provision of budget support: right-wing governments are less inclined to engage in this aid modality, which often entails high fiduciary and political risks.

We thus argue that the traditional cleavage in established Western democracies between left-wing and right-wing political orientations should also be reflected in citizen's attitudes toward political conditionality in foreign aid. Consequently, our third hypothesis is as follows:

*H3 : Citizens with right-wing political attitudes are expected to be more supportive of political conditionality than citizens with left-wing political attitudes.*

In addition, we assume that citizens' perceptions of the meritocratic level of their own state apparatus will affect their likelihood of supporting political conditionality and foreign aid. This assumption is related to the literature examining citizens' trust in their own state as a determinant of foreign aid support. Although Paxton and Knack (2012) find no correlation between general trust in one's own government and support for foreign aid, there are theoretical reasons to assume that such a link may exist. For instance, Popkin and Dimock (2000) argue that people who trust their own government are also more likely to believe that the government can successfully intervene in other countries, which is of particular importance in the area of foreign aid. Moreover, Hetherington and Globetti (2002) show that trust in government is important when the benefits of the government's activities accrue to others, which is also the case in foreign aid. Moreover, evidence from the welfare state literature indicates that people's support for broader forms of domestic redistribution is determined by their level of confidence in the state apparatus (Rothstein, 1998).

Where citizens believe that politics and policy processes are characterized by low levels of transparency or high levels of corruption, we expect them to be much more sceptical about the state's capacity to redistribute taxpayers' money in a benevolent manner without the influence of powerful special-interest groups. Thus, we expect that the perception of an individual's own state as characterized by high levels of corruption will not only decrease willingness to support redistributive policies, but also increase the preference for conditionality as a means to constrain the manoeuvring space of policy-makers.<sup>5</sup> In other words, we expect that support for conditional redistribution will increase as trust in the functioning of one's own state apparatus decreases, since conditionality constrains the leeway of policy implementation and also allows for better monitoring and control of state entities. These considerations should also apply to political conditionality in foreign aid. Therefore, we expect that the perception of the meritocratic functioning of one's own state will affect the likelihood of supporting political conditionality in foreign aid.

*H4 : The likelihood of supporting political conditionality in foreign aid is expected to decrease as citizens' level of trust in the functioning of their own state apparatus increases.*

Finally, the effect of political left/right orientation on attitudes toward political conditionality in foreign aid should be restricted to countries in which the division between left and right has traditionally been anchored in political cleavages. We believe that this distinction is important because the argument that government ideology along the left/right cleavage is significant for aid allocation, universalism and redistributive policies (see Bergh, 2004; Tingley, 2010) implicitly assumes that political competition is structured along the left/right cleavage. However, this is not necessarily the case in many new EU Member States, where the left/right continuum has been inherently instable and is not a critical determinant for voting decisions (Casal Bértoa, 2014). Accordingly, we formulate our fifth hypothesis:

<sup>5</sup> This raises the question of why voters should believe that politicians will choose the terms of conditionality in the appropriate way. Voters who do not trust politicians' ability to choose the correct terms of conditionality should reject both conditionality and foreign aid. However, only 0.4 per cent of the respondents in our sample rejected both aspects. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that voters prefer conditionality to place restrictions on their government's foreign aid policy.

*H5 : In societies that have not been traditionally organized along a left/right divide, political orientations formulated on a left/right continuum will not affect the likelihood of supporting political conditionality in foreign aid.*

### 3. Data

To analyze citizens' preferences for foreign aid and conditionality, we use survey data from Eurobarometer 76.1 collected in 2011.<sup>6</sup> These data were gathered using a multi-stage random probability design (Nissen, 2014) and cover 27 EU Member States and 25,444 respondents over the age of 15 years. The advantage of this resource is that it explicitly asks EU citizens about their preferences on both foreign aid and political conditionality<sup>7</sup>; however, the Eurobarometers have also been criticized for their methodological shortcomings.<sup>8</sup> In particular, Schmitt (2003) and Höpner and Jurczyk (2015) contend that respondents often do not have the knowledge required to be able to answer the questions. While many questions in the Eurobarometers do indeed require advanced knowledge, we do not believe that the questions on foreign aid and conditionality that we investigate pose a challenge to respondents in terms of background knowledge. Question QD1, which asks about general support for foreign aid, is formulated as follows:

'In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important that the EU help people in developing countries?'

The answer categories for this question are: 'No, definitely not' (1), 'No, not really' (2), 'Yes, to some extent' (3), and 'Yes, definitely' (4). Question QD5 is formulated as follows:

'Do you think that the EU should require developing countries to follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid?'

The answer categories here are: 'No, definitely not' (1), 'No, not really' (2), 'Yes, to some extent' (3), and 'Yes, definitely' (4). One caveat is that the question does not allow us to distinguish between *ex-ante/ex-post* or positive/negative conditionality.

Our two dependent variables thus consist of the 4-item answer categories.<sup>9</sup> A majority of all respondents are also in favour of foreign aid: 50 per cent are supportive and 36.5 per cent are very supportive of foreign aid. The share of the latter category is slightly smaller

<sup>6</sup> See [http://www.gesis.org/?id=7509&tx\\_eurobarometer\\_pi1\[vol\]=7509&tx\\_eurobarometer\\_pi1\[pos1\]=1110](http://www.gesis.org/?id=7509&tx_eurobarometer_pi1[vol]=7509&tx_eurobarometer_pi1[pos1]=1110), last accessed 10 May 2014. Eurobarometer 77.4 includes newer information on the foreign aid preferences of EU citizens. However, it does not contain any information on preferences for conditionality, which is why we do not include this element in our analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the introduction to the question explicitly states that 'EU development aid consists of the aid provided by both the European Commission and the national Governments of the EU Member States'.

<sup>8</sup> Höpner and Jurczyk (2015) argue that the wording, framing and answer categories of Eurobarometer questions are often biased towards EU-friendly answers. Nissen (2014) shows that the wording of questions changes over subsequent survey waves. We believe that neither problem affects the Eurobarometer questions we investigate. We are also aware of a potential issue involving the issue of co-determination of dependent and independent variables. The only solution to this problem would be panel survey data, which might become available in the future.

<sup>9</sup> A cross-table of both variables including all categories can be obtained upon request.



in the new EU donor states, with 29 per cent. Moreover, 53 per cent of all respondents are very supportive of conditionality, and 38 per cent are supportive of conditionality. Only 9 per cent reject conditionality. The share of respondents who strongly support conditionality is even larger in the new EU donor states (over 55 per cent). Thus, we see that a majority of European respondents strongly support conditionality, but a majority also support foreign aid, with some differences between the groups of traditional and new EU donor states.

As key individual-level variables we include respondents' political orientation and perception of corruption (in the respondent's own country) and education. The position on the left/right spectrum is measured by *Political orientation*, which ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is support for left-wing parties and 10 for right-wing parties. *Corruption perception* is our proxy variable measuring individuals' trust in the meritocratic functioning of the state. This categorical variable is based on the survey question asking whether respondents perceive corruption to be a major problem in their country, where 0 denotes complete disagreement and 4 complete agreement with the statement that corruption is a major problem. Milner and Tingley (2011) operationalize respondents' endowment with human capital in terms of their skill level. Accordingly, we use the level of *Education*, measured in number of years.

Our individual-level covariates are age, gender and income. *Age* is measured in years. The gender variable *Female* is coded as 0 for male and 1 for female. As there is no question related to income in the survey, we measure respondents' wealth by house ownership: *House ownership* is coded as 1 if a respondent owns a house outright or with a mortgage, and 0 otherwise.<sup>10</sup>

On the country level, we include a country's level of governance, the growth rate, the Gini coefficient, a dummy variable to indicate a former colonial power and another dummy variable to denote traditional versus new donor state.<sup>11</sup> The first three variables are five-year averages over the period 2007–11. *Governance* comes from the effectiveness of governance variable (World Bank, 2013), while *Growth* is defined as the yearly GDP growth rate in percent. *Gini coefficients* are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014).<sup>12</sup>

#### 4. Results

Table 1 presents our estimation results. The dependent categorical variables are *Foreign aid* and *Conditionality*. Models 1 and 2 are ordered-probit estimations with clustered standard errors and include country dummies.<sup>13</sup> Models 3–8 include both individual level and country level covariates. A multilevel model controlling for clustering effects on the country level is thus in order (Goldstein, 2011; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). With

<sup>10</sup> House ownership as a proxy variable for income may still have shortcomings, as it could capture cultural differences between countries.

<sup>11</sup> Initially, we also included the amount of official development assistance (ODA), but this variable is highly correlated with governance (0.8).

<sup>12</sup> Summary statistics and the bivariate correlations are available upon request.

<sup>13</sup> Models including country dummies can be inconsistent and may yield substantially biased estimates when the number of respondents in each country is very small. However, given the high number of observations per country in our data there should be no problems of consistency (Greene, 2002).

Table 1: Estimation of Support for Foreign Aid and Conditionality

<i>Dependent variable</i>	(1) <i>Foreign aid</i>	(2) <i>Conditionality</i>	(3) <i>Foreign aid</i>	(4) <i>Conditionality</i>
<b>Individual level variables</b>				
<i>Political orientation</i>	-0.045*** (0.010)	0.023** (0.009)	-0.047*** (0.010)	0.024** (0.008)
<i>Corruption perception</i>	-0.033 (0.030)	0.095*** (0.021)	-0.044 (0.027)	0.092** (0.028)
<i>Age (log)</i>	-0.131** (0.043)	0.110** (0.033)	-0.134** (0.042)	0.106** (0.039)
<i>Female</i>	0.080*** (0.018)	-0.032* (0.015)	0.080*** (0.018)	-0.032* (0.014)
<i>Education (log)</i>	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.016)
<i>House ownership</i>	0.086** (0.029)	0.119** (0.041)	0.095** (0.029)	0.112** (0.042)
<b>Country level variables</b>				
<i>Governance (2007–11)</i>			0.308*** (0.037)	0.093 (0.072)
<i>Growth (2007–11)</i>			-0.012 (0.008)	0.033 (0.021)
<i>Gini coefficient (2007–11)</i>			0.474* (0.195)	0.225 (0.332)
Cut 1	-2.547 (0.174)	-0.859 (0.127)	-0.652 (0.705)	-0.210 (1.195)
Cut 2	-1.795 (0.171)	-0.227 (0.128)	0.098 (0.706)	0.418 (1.187)
Cut 3	-0.268 (0.190)	1.070 (0.120)	1.620 (0.707)	1.691 (1.181)
Countries	27	27	27	27
Observations	20,147	19,808	20,147	19,808
Log pseudo-likelihood	-20,388.1	-18,825.2	-20,473.6	-19,113.9
Pseudo $R^2$	0.041	0.025		
Wald $\chi^2$			309.1***	75.6***

Note: Models 1 and 2 are ordered probit models with robust clustered standard errors and include country dummies; models 3 and 4 are multilevel ordered probit models with robust clustered standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.005$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

the country-level variables we use multi-level ordered probit models with random intercepts.

*Political orientation* is highly statistically significant in the first two models and has the expected negative sign in model 1 and a positive sign in model 2: EU citizens with right-wing attitudes are less likely to support foreign aid and more likely to favour conditionality. Thus, the correlation between *Political orientation* and preferences for foreign aid is in line with our theoretical expectations.<sup>14</sup> *Corruption perception* is positively correlated with support for conditionality. The positive and significant sign of *Corruption perception* in model 2 is in accordance with our fourth hypothesis, which highlights the role of trust in one's own government for support of conditionality (Hetherington and Globetti, 2002) and effective intervention in other countries (Popkin and Dimock, 2000). We considered the possibility of multicollinearity; however, our Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests showed no problems of multicollinearity in the models. The main results of models 1 and 2 thus corroborate our hypotheses that more right-wing voters are less supportive of foreign aid and are more in favour of political conditionality and that lack of trust in the government is positively correlated with support of conditionality. *Education* enters with a positive (models 1 and 3) and a negative sign (models 2 and 4), but these correlations are not statistically significant. This is a striking result, given that other studies have found a strong effect of human capital on preferences for foreign aid (Milner and Tingley, 2011).

<sup>14</sup> We also tested for a non-linear effect using the squared term of *Political orientation*. However, the size of the non-linear effect is so weak that it can be neglected, and the squared term is no longer significant when the country-level variables are included in the estimations.

Table 2: Empirical Estimation for Traditional and New EU Donor Countries

Dependent variable	Foreign aid		Conditionality	
	(5) Traditional donors	(6) New donors	(7) Traditional donors	(8) New donors
Individual level variables				
<i>Political orientation</i>	-0.079*** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.033* (0.014)	0.008 (0.009)
<i>Corruption perception</i>	-0.093** (0.027)	0.080** (0.025)	0.100*** (0.026)	0.162*** (0.030)
<i>Age (log)</i>	-0.090 (0.052)	-0.164** (0.077)	0.088 (0.045)	0.089 (0.050)
<i>Female</i>	0.070* (0.028)	0.101*** (0.019)	-0.045* (0.019)	-0.009 (0.021)
<i>Education (log)</i>	0.015 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.018)	0.010 (0.016)
<i>House ownership</i>	0.086* (0.040)	0.053 (0.037)	0.145** (0.052)	0.072 (0.058)
Country level variables				
<i>Governance (2007–11)</i>	0.195*** (0.019)	0.128 (0.180)	-0.017 (0.063)	0.516*** (0.117)
<i>Growth (2007–11)</i>	-0.021*** (0.003)	0.281* (0.117)	0.039** (0.009)	0.238** (0.076)
<i>Gini coefficient (2007–11)</i>	-0.471*** (0.118)	0.724 (0.461)	-0.035 (0.208)	1.303*** (0.347)
Cut 1	-4.103*** (0.424)	0.715 (1.880)	-1.292 (0.705)	3.891** (1.385)
Cut 2	-3.416*** (0.405)	1.549 (1.858)	-0.684 (0.707)	4.585** (1.373)
Cut 3	-1.944*** (0.383)	3.155 (1.874)	0.571 (0.711)	5.949*** (1.349)
Countries	15	12	15	12
Observations	12,535	7,622	12,287	7,521
Log pseudo-likelihood	-12,467.7	-7,917.5	-12,158.1	-6,727.5
Wald $\chi^2$	2130.9***	342.1***	213.3***	78.7***

Note: All models are multilevel ordered probit models with robust clustered standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.005$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Although *Education* has the expected coefficient signs, the lack of statistical significance shows that distributional concerns (our second hypothesis) play no role in preference formation on foreign aid of European citizens.

Other statistically significant individual-level variables are *Age*, *Female* and *House ownership*. Older people are more likely to be against foreign aid and in favour of conditionality. Women tend to be more generous than men: They are less likely to support conditionality and more likely to be in favour of foreign aid. Moreover, *House ownership* has a positive and statistically significant sign in model 2, indicating that wealthier respondents are also more likely to favour conditionality. The positive sign of *House ownership* in models 1 and 3 complements the findings of Chong and Gradstein (2008), who report that support for foreign aid increases with income.

Models 3 and 4 include the country-level variables. The correlations of our key independent variables remain robust when country-level variables are included. *House ownership* becomes significant in model 3 corroborating the increase of support of foreign aid with increasing income. In model 4, the country-level variable *Governance* has a positive and significant sign – evidence that EU citizens living in better-governed countries are more supportive of foreign aid, which is in line with findings from the literature that trust in government increases support for redistribution (cf. Hetherington and Globetti, 2002).<sup>15</sup> *Gini coefficient* is also weakly statistically significant in model

<sup>15</sup> A test for non-linear effects of the *Governance* in the full sample did not yield significant results.

3, but not in model 4. We also tested cross-level interactions, but the magnitudes of their marginal effects are weak.

In a next step, we tested our fifth hypothesis that political cleavages would have different effects regarding foreign aid and conditionality in traditional and new EU donor states. Table 2 shows the results for these two sub-samples of EU donor states. In models 5–8, the results previously obtained for *Political orientation* and *Corruption perception* remain robust for traditional donor states. EU citizens with more right-wing views and those who are more concerned about domestic corruption are less supportive of foreign aid and more supportive of conditionality. In contrast, in the sample of new EU donor states, *Political orientation* is not significantly correlated with the dependent variables. This finding supports our fifth hypothesis. *Political orientation* is only significant in traditional EU donor states, which can be explained by the under-institutionalization of party systems in many Eastern European Member States (Casal Bértoa, 2014). *Corruption perception* is strongly and statistically significantly correlated with the outcome variables in models 7 and 8. In both traditional and new EU donor states citizens are more supportive of conditionality if they perceive their governments as being corrupt.

Country-level variables matter in accounting for support for conditionality in the new EU donor countries, and for the most part they corroborate the difference between traditional and new EU donor states. In model 8, better *Governance* is correlated with support for conditionality in the case of new donor states. We explain this difference between the two samples by the fact that traditional EU donor countries have much higher governance values than new EU donor states – mostly post-Communist countries, many of which are still struggling with the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law.<sup>16</sup> It can thus be argued that governance is more of a concern for respondents in new donor states than in old donor states. *Gini coefficient* is also positive in model 8, indicating that respondents in more unequal new EU donor countries are less lenient and more supportive of conditionality. *Governance* and *Gini coefficient* do not matter for support of conditionality in the case of traditional EU donor states (model 7). The positive and significant sign of *Growth* in models 6 and 8 suggests that respondents in new EU donor countries that are becoming wealthier are more likely to embrace foreign aid but also conditionality.<sup>17</sup>

As a next step we investigated the magnitudes of the effects in our main individual-level models in more detail, based on models 1 and 2. Our first two hypotheses highlighted the effect of a left/right cleavage and human capital on individual preferences for foreign aid. Our variable measuring human capital – *Education* – did not turn out to be statistically significant in any of our models. Human capital does not seem to play a decisive role in preference formation on foreign aid in our sample, but the relationship needs a more detailed investigation before conclusions can be made. *Political orientation*, however, is highly statistically significant and the marginal effect of *Political orientation*

<sup>16</sup> The sample of traditional EU donor states has a higher standard deviation for *Governance* than the sample of new EU donor states. Therefore, the correlation cannot be explained by the variable's lack of variation within the traditional EU donor group.

<sup>17</sup> We do not explore the random effects of our multi-level model in more detail. Because the numbers of countries included in our multi-level models are relatively small, the random intercepts and slopes are underestimated, and thus the effects of the country estimates are unreliable (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016).

on *Support for foreign aid* is strong.<sup>18</sup> A shift from left to right political orientation is correlated with a reduced likelihood of strong support for foreign aid (fourth category) by 14 percentage points, but the correlation is weaker in categories 1–2 of *Support for foreign aid*. In category 3 right-wing respondents are slightly more likely to approve foreign aid ‘to some extent’, but the effect is weak in comparison to the rejection of ‘strong support’ (category 4) by right-wing respondents. The main preference split among European citizens regarding foreign aid is between categories 3 and 4.<sup>18</sup> Most citizens are in favour of foreign aid, but the degree of support markedly differs. *Political orientation* is strongly correlated with *Support of foreign aid* in traditional EU donor states. A shift from left to right decreases support in category 4 by 26 percentage points, while it only decreases support in new EU donor states by 2 percentage points (not shown in the Figure), which corroborates our fifth hypothesis. Our results are in line with previous findings that political ideology correlates with foreign aid preferences (*cf.* Milner and Tingley, 2013). However, in the case of EU citizens our conclusions are more nuanced; political preferences matter only in traditional EU donor states.

Our next set of hypotheses refers to the preferences for conditionality. We argue that in addition to political preferences, the perception of the meritocratic functioning of the government affects individual preference formation. *Political orientation* is also statistically significant in model 2, and its correlation with *Support of conditionality* is strong. A shift from left to right is associated with an increase in the respondent’s likelihood of supporting conditionality (‘Yes, definitely’) of 8 percentage points.<sup>18</sup> As with foreign aid, the main split regarding preferences for conditionality is between categories 3 and 4. Moreover, the stronger correlation is within the sample of traditional EU donor states, where a shift from left to right is associated with an increase in support of 12 percentage points; the respective increase is only 4 percentage points in the sample of new EU donor states. The correlation of the variable *Corruption perception* is also substantial – a change from lowest to highest corruption perception is correlated with an increase in the likelihood of strongly supporting conditionality (category 4) of 11 percentage points. But in the case of *Corruption perception*, the effect is more robust for the sample of new EU donor states, where a shift from the lowest to the highest value of the variable increases *Support for conditionality* by 16 percentage points in contrast to 9 percentage points in the sample of traditional EU donor states. These results highlight the role of trust in government (Popkin and Dimock, 2000). EU citizens who do not trust in the meritocratic functioning of the government are strongly in favour of conditionality. Levels of trust seem to be particularly low in the new EU donor states, where a higher percentage of citizens is strongly in favour of conditionality: *Corruption perception* is the only variable that is correlated with conditionality in these countries.

## 5. Conclusion

Foreign aid as a measure of international redistribution requires strong public support. A large majority of EU citizens, more than 85 per cent, are in favour of foreign aid as such. Despite the fact that the EU is reluctant to use political conditionality (*cf.* Del Biondo and Orbie, 2014) European citizens also articulate a strong preference for political

<sup>18</sup> See Figures A1 and A2 in the online Appendix for the marginal effects.

conditionality in foreign aid. Almost 99 per cent of respondents in Cyprus are supportive of conditionality; in contrast, 86 per cent of Danish respondents favour conditionality, but this is still a large margin of support. The overwhelming preference among European citizens for political conditionality makes it extremely difficult for democratically legitimized donor governments to neglect political criteria in foreign aid allocation. In this regard, the overwhelming demand for political conditionality also helps to explain why policy-makers in EU donor countries are often particularly keen on applying aid sanctions when parliamentarians, the media or human-rights activists in donor countries become aware of critical events in recipient countries.

Our analysis contributes to the identification of individual-level factors that have driven the societal demand for ODA. One important result is that EU citizens with more left-wing political orientations are more in favour of foreign aid – but only in traditional EU donor states. The political left/right continuum plays no role for individual preferences on foreign aid in the new donor states. EU citizens who perceive corruption to be a problem in their own country are more supportive of conditionality, potentially as a means of restricting the manoeuvring space of their own state entities. This effect is particularly strong in the sample of new EU donor states. In addition, respondents on the right side of the political left/right spectrum are more supportive of conditionality in foreign aid. Again, this effect of political orientation is found primarily in the sample of traditional EU donor states, where the political left/right cleavage is institutionalized. The policy implication is that strong public demand for conditionality may make it difficult for European donor countries to co-operate with recipient governments that are unable to comply with certain aspects of political conditionality; in such instances, official aid channels may be side-lined in favour of greater aid allocation to non-state actors (Dietrich, 2013).

We also provide an explanation for why individual-level data do not uniformly determine the existing variance in public support for political conditionality. With regard to the contextual country conditions, the results show that respondents in better-governed countries are more supportive of foreign aid; in addition, respondents in better-governed new EU donor states are more likely to support conditionality. Differences in public attitudes toward ODA in traditional and new EU donor states hardly come as a surprise, as differences in ODA policies and public awareness between the two country groups have already been observed in the literature (Horký and Lightfoot, 2012; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, 2014). However, the exact interaction between support for foreign aid and support for conditionality necessitates further exploration, also against the background of the traditional versus new donor countries divide within the EU.

Otter (2003) has observed that the impact of public opinion on the foreign aid policies of governments is limited. This has problematic policy implications, as public support for the EU crucially depends on accountability with regards to voters' preferences (McEvoy, 2016). Given the large variance in terms of the structure and disbursement of foreign aid among EU Member States (Orbie and Carbone, 2016) and particularly the cuts in the foreign aid budgets of some EU Member States future research should investigate the link between public opinion and aid allocation by EU donor countries in more detail, especially in the context of the current refugee crisis in Europe. In 2015 some EU donor countries have increased their foreign aid budgets

due to in-donor refugee costs,<sup>19</sup> and only Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom met their aid targets in 2015.<sup>20</sup> Right-wing public opinion, by contrast, may press for more rather than less foreign aid in order to stop the influx of refugees, making it increasingly important to improve our understanding of the interplay between EU public opinion and governments' foreign aid policies.

The delivery channels of foreign aid in the EU are a further potential line of investigation. Brech and Potrafke (2014) argue that leftist governments prefer grant aid. Our survey data do not cover preferences for specific delivery channels, but this aspect may be of importance in order to fully comprehend the variety of foreign aid policies in the EU Member States. In addition, we need to understand the simultaneous support for foreign aid and political conditionality. The problem of endogeneity in our survey prevented us from exploring this link. In this paper, we have shed light on individual preferences, but we have yet to determine how governments in both old and new EU donor states actually respond to preferences for foreign aid and conditionality in terms of aid allocation.

#### *Correspondence:*

Thilo Bodenstern  
School of Public Policy  
Central European University  
Nador u. 9  
H-1051 Budapest  
Hungary  
email: bodensteint@spp.ceu.edu

## References

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2002) 'Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 117, No. 4, pp. 1231–94.
- Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000) 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?' *Journal of Economic Growth*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 33–63.
- Alesina, A. and Weder, B. (2002) 'Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?' *American Economic Review*, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 1126–37.
- Apodaca, C. and Stohl, M. (1999) 'United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 185–98.
- Bader, J. and Faust, J. (2014) 'Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Autocratic Survival'. *International Studies Review*, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 575–95.
- Barthel, F., Neumayer, E., Nunnenkamp, P. and Selaya, P. (2014) 'Competition for Export Markets and the Allocation of Foreign Aid: The Role of Spatial Dependence among Donor Countries'. *World Development*, Vol. 64, pp. 350–65.
- Bauhr, M., Charron, N. and Nasiritousi, N. (2013) 'Does Corruption Cause Aid Fatigue? Public Opinion and the Aid-Corruption Paradox'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 568–79.

<sup>19</sup> These countries are Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Sweden (see <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf>, last accessed: 2 October 2016).

<sup>20</sup> CONCORD AidWatch Report 2016 (see [https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CONCORD\\_AidWatch\\_Report\\_2016\\_web.pdf?ac2091](https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CONCORD_AidWatch_Report_2016_web.pdf?ac2091), last accessed: 12 January 2017).

- Bergh, A. (2004) 'The Universal Welfare State: Theory and the Case of Sweden'. *Political Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 745–66.
- Birchler, K., Limpach, S. and Michaelowa, K. (2016) 'Aid Modalities Matter: The Impact of Different World Bank and IMF Programs on Democratization in Developing Countries'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 427–39.
- Bodenstein, T. and Kemmerling, A. (2015) 'A Paradox of Redistribution in International Aid? The Determinants of Poverty-Oriented Development Assistance'. *World Development*, Vol. 76, pp. 359–69.
- Bodenstein, T., Faust, J. and Furness, M. (2016) 'European Union Development Policy: Collective Action in Times of Global Transformation and Domestic Crisis'. *Development Policy Review*, (Special Issue), forthcoming. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12189>
- Boone, P. (1996) 'Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid'. *European Economic Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 289–329.
- Börzel, T.A. and Hackenesch, C. (2013) 'Small Carrots, Few Sticks: EU Good Governance Promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 536–55.
- Brancati, D. (2014) 'The Determinants of US Public Opinion towards Democracy Promotion'. *Political Behavior*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 705–30.
- Brech, V. and Potrafke, N. (2014) 'Donor Ideology and Types of Foreign Aid'. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 61–75.
- Bryan, M.L. and Jenkins, S.P. (2016) 'Multilevel Modelling of Country Effects: A Cautionary Tale'. *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 3–22.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Smith, A. (2009) 'A Political Economy of Aid'. *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 309–40.
- Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000) 'Aid, Policies, and Growth'. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 847–68.
- Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2004) *Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence* (Policy Research Working Paper 3251) (Washington, DC: World Bank).
- Casal Bértoa, F. (2014) 'Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Revisited: A Sociological Explanation of Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe'. *Party Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 16–36.
- Chong, A. and Gradstein, M. (2008) 'What Determines Foreign Aid? The Donor's Perspective'. *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 1–13.
- Clist, P. (2011) '25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?' *World Development*, Vol. 39, No. 10, pp. 1724–34.
- Del Biondo, K. and Orbie, J. (2014) 'The European Commission's Implementation of Budget Support and the Governance Incentive Tranche in Ethiopia: Democracy Promoter or Development Donor?' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 411–27.
- Dietrich, S. (2013) 'Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation'. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 698–712.
- Dietrich, S. and Wright, J. (2015) 'Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa'. *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 216–34.
- Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E. and Vreeland, J.R. (2009) 'Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?' *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 1–18.
- Faust, J. and Garcia, M.M. (2014) 'With or Without Force? European Public Opinion on Democracy Promotion'. *JCMS*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 861–78.
- Faust, J. and Koch, S. (2014) *Foreign Aid and the Domestic Politics of European Budget Support* (Discussion Paper 21) (Bonn: German Development Institute).
- Feldman, S. (1983) 'Economic Individualism and American Public Opinion'. *American Politics Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 3–29.



- Fisher, J. (2015) 'Does it Work' – Work for Whom? Britain and Political Conditionality Since the Cold War'. *World Development*, Vol. 75, pp. 13–25.
- Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984) *Social Cognition: From Brains to Culture* (New York: Random House).
- Goldstein, H. (2011) *Multilevel Statistical Models* (4th edition) (Chichester: Wiley).
- Greene, W. (2002) 'The Bias of the Fixed Effects Estimator in Nonlinear Models'. Unpublished paper, New York University.
- Grimm, S. and Leininger, J. (2012) 'Not All Good Things Go Together: Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion'. *Democratization*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 391–414.
- Grindle, M.S. (2011) 'Governance Reform: The New Analytics of Next Steps'. *Governance*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 415–18.
- Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y. and Bryant, K.A. (2016) 'Public Opinion and Foreign Aid Cuts in Economic Crises'. *World Development*, Vol. 77, pp. 66–79.
- Henson, S. and Lindstrom, J. (2013) "'A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep"? Understanding Public Support for Aid: The Case of the United Kingdom'. *World Development*, Vol. 42, pp. 67–75.
- Hetherington, M.J. and Globetti, S. (2002) 'Political Trust and Racial Policy Preferences'. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 253–75.
- Hodler, R. and Raschky, P.A. (2014) 'Regional Favoritism'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 995–1033.
- Hooghe, L. (2003) 'Europe Divided? Elites vs. Public Opinion on European Integration'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 281–304.
- Höpner, M. and Jurczyk, B. (2015) 'How the Eurobarometer Blurs the Line Between Research and Propaganda'. MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/6.
- Horký, O. and Lightfoot, S. (2012) 'From Aid Recipients to Aid Donors? Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States'. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 1–16.
- Keefer, P., Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2011) 'Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention'. *World Development*, Vol. 39, No. 9, pp. 1530–41.
- Koch, S. (2015) 'A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union'. *World Development*, Vol. 75, pp. 97–108.
- Kono, D.Y., Montinola, G.R. and Verbon, N. (2015) 'Helping Hand or Heavy Hand? Foreign Aid, Regime Type, and Domestic Unrest'. *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 409–24.
- Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) 'The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries'. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 63, No. 5, pp. 661–87.
- Kosack, S. (2003) 'Effective Aid: How Democracy Allows Development Aid to Improve the Quality of Life'. *World Development*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1–22.
- Lake, D.A. and Baum, M.A. (2001) 'The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services'. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 587–621.
- Lightfoot, S. (2010) 'The Europeanisation of International Development Policies: The Case of Central and Eastern European States'. *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 329–50.
- Lightfoot, S. and Szent-Iványi, B. (2014) 'Reluctant Donors? The Europeanization of International Development Policies in the New Member States'. *JCMS*, Vol. 52, No. 6, pp. 1257–72.
- Michaelowa, K., Reinsberg, B. and Schneider, C. (2016) 'Multi-bi Aid in European Development Assistance: The Role of Capacity Constraints and Member State Politics'. *Development Policy Review*, (Special Issue), forthcoming. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12193>
- McEvoy, C. (2016) 'The Role of Political Efficacy on Public Opinion in the European Union'. *JCMS*, Vol. 54, No. 5, pp. 1159–74.

- McLean, E.V. (2015) 'Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic Interests'. *International Organization*, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 97–130.
- Milner, H.V. (2006) 'Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems'. In Hawkins, D.G., Lake, D.A., Nielson, D.L. and Tierney, M.J. (eds) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 107–39.
- Milner, H.V. and Tingley, D. (2013) 'Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay'. *International Interactions*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 389–401.
- Milner, H.V. and Tingley, D.H. (2011) 'Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy'. *International Organization*, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 37–68.
- Molenaers, N. (2012) 'The Great Divide? Donor Perceptions of Budget Support, Eligibility and Policy Dialogue'. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 5, pp. 791–806.
- Molenaers, N., Dellepiane, S. and Faust, J. (2015) 'Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid'. *World Development*, Vol. 75, pp. 2–12.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997) 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics'. *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 513–53.
- Morrison, K.M. (2009) 'Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability'. *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 107–38.
- Nissen, S. (2014) 'The Eurobarometer and the Process of European Integration: Methodological Foundations and Weaknesses of the Largest European Survey'. *Quality & Quantity*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 713–27.
- Noël, A. and Thérien, J.-P. (1995) 'From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid'. *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 523–53.
- Olson, M. (1993) 'Dictatorship, Democracy and Development'. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 567–76.
- Orbie, J. and Carbone, M. (2016) 'The Europeanisation of Development Policy'. *European Politics and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1–11.
- Otter, M. (2003) 'Domestic Public Support for Foreign Aid: Does it Matter?' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 115–25.
- Paxton, P. and Knack, S. (2012) 'Individual and Country-Level Factors Affecting Support for Foreign Aid'. *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 171–92.
- Piketty, T. (1995) 'Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 110, No. 3, pp. 551–84.
- Popkin, S.L. and Dimock, M.A. (2000) 'Knowledge, Trust, and International Reasoning'. In Lupia, A., McCubbins, M.D. and Popkin, S.L. (eds) *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press), 214–38.
- Reinsberg, B. (2015) 'Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization'. *World Development*, Vol. 75, pp. 46–61.
- Rothstein, B. (1998) *Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and the Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press).
- Schmitt, H. (2003) 'The Eurobarometers: Their Evolution, Obvious Merits, and Ways to Add Value to Them'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 243–51.
- Schoen, H. (2008) 'Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence'. *European Union Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 5–29.
- Steenbergen, M.R. and Jones, B.S. (2002) 'Modeling Multilevel Data Structures'. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 218–37.
- Svensson, J. (2003) 'Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work and What Can Be Done About It?' *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 381–402.

- Thérien, J.-P. and Noël, A. (2000) 'Political Parties and Foreign Aid'. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 151–62.
- Tingley, D. (2010) 'Donors and Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid Effort'. *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 40–9.
- Van Heerde, J. and Hudson, D. (2010) "'The Righteous Considereth the Cause of the Poor'"? Public Attitudes towards Poverty in Developing Countries'. *Political Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 389–409.
- World Bank (2013) *Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996–2012* (Washington, DC: The World Bank).
- World Bank (2014) *World Development Indicators, 1960–2013* (Washington, DC: The World Bank).
- Younas, J. (2008) 'Motivation for Bilateral Aid Allocation: Altruism or Trade Benefits'. *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 661–74.

### Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting information tab for this article.

**Figure A1:** Marginal Effect of Political Orientation on Support for Foreign Aid.

**Figure A2:** Marginal Effect of Political Orientation and Corruption Perception on Support for Conditionality.