

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FROM A PARTNER PERSPECTIVE

How can Germany and other donors perform better in the eyes of their partner countries?

Online Appendix

2020

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	French Development Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMF	Arab Monetary Fund
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CABEI	Central American Bank for Economic Integration
CAF	Development Bank of Latin America
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CIM	Center for International Migration and Development
CPA	Country programmable aid
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DEval	Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (German Institute for Development Evaluation)
DFID	UK Department for International Development
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
FE	Fixed Effect
Gavi	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross National Income
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Development Bank)
LtLS	Listening to Leaders Survey
MCC	USA Millennium Challenge Corporation

MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NL	Netherlands
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEV	Projektevaluierung (project evaluation)
PFK	Projektfortschrittskontrolle (project progress review)
PFM	Public Financial Management
RES	Reform Efforts Survey
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USA	United States of America
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WDI	World Development Indicators

1. INTRODUCTION


The online appendix follows the chapter structure of the DEval-report. For the first chapter there is no additional material. In Chapter 2, we provide additional information about the conceptual framework, followed by inclusion criteria and background information on the methodology (Chapter 3). Regarding the results, the findings are divided in two parts: all donors' perceived performance (Chapter 4) and the perception of Germany's development cooperation by partner countries (Chapter 5).

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Aid Effectiveness

Figure 1 provides an overview of the different international high level meetings that have taken place to discuss aid effectiveness principles and indicators, first organized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), then by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) that has been founded in 2011.

Figure 1 Overview of high level meetings and progress reports on Aid Effectiveness



Note. Figure shows publication years for the Progress Reports, survey periods of Monitoring Rounds may deviate. The Progress Report published in 2008 refers to two separate survey periods, 2005 and 2007. Source: authors' own figure.

The second section of factors used in the regression analysis were the indicators of effective development cooperation that have been part of the last three progress monitoring rounds in 2011, 2014 and 2016. Table 1 shows which indicators were used in the monitoring rounds. We included the four indicators that were reported in all of those rounds. Since the agendas themselves have undergone changes in indicators that donors and partner countries report progress on, the fact that these four factors have stayed the course reflects their importance in the effective development cooperation discourse.

Table 1 Comparison Aid Effectiveness Indicators

Quality country strategies	Quality country systems	Quality country systems	Existence results frameworks	Country systems strengthened	Untied aid	Coordinated technical support	Use country systems	Parallel implementation structures	Program-based aid	Coordinated missions	Joint analytical works	Cooperation focus on results	Use of results frameworks	Results frameworks in place	Aid on budget	Transparent information	Predictability	Mutual review/ accountability	CSOs	Private sector	Gender equality
Paris - OECD Progress 2011																					
✓	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	-	-	-
Busan - GPEDC Progress 2014																					
-	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Busan - GPEDC Progress 2016																					
-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
→ Selection for this study, because used in all progress reports, thus relevant																					
					✓		✓								✓		✓	X			

Note. ✓ = Indicator included in monitoring rounds, - = data not gathered in monitoring round, X = not selected because of too many missing values. For untied aid another dataset was used because of missing values. For details on the datasets see operationalization sheet of the independent variables. Source: OECD (2008: 22, 2012: 19), OECD and UNDP (2014: 26–28, 2016a: 7–8).

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Online Survey

Table 2 shows all inter-governmental organisations and multilateral development banks that were cited by the respondents of the 2017 LtLS questionnaire to have provided their government or their team with advice or assistance related to a policy initiative.

Table 2 Inter-governmental organisations and multilateral development banks

1	African Development Bank (AfDB)	12	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
2	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	13	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
3	Arab Monetary Fund (AMF)	14	International Finance Corporation (IFC)
4	Asian Development Bank (ADB)	15	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
5	Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	16	International Monetary Fund (IMF)
6	Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	17	Islamic Development Bank (ISDB)
7	Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)	18	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
8	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	19	OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)
9	European Union (EU)	20	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
10	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (Gavi Alliance)	21	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
11	Global Environment Facility (GEF)	22	World Bank

Note. This table refers to question 22.1.1 of the 2017 LtLS questionnaire. Source: 2017 LtLS.

The 2017 LtLS respondents selected all foreign and domestic organisations that provided their government or their team with advice or assistance related to a policy initiative from this list (Table 3).

Table 3 Foreign embassies and bilateral agencies

1	Australia - Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)	27	Japan - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Japan
2	Australia - Australian High Commission	28	Japan - Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
3	Australia - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Australia	29	Japan - Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
4	Belgium - Belgian Development Agency (BTC)	30	Japan - Representative Office of Japan
5	Belgium - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Belgium	31	Kuwait - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Kuwait
6	Brazil - Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)	32	Kuwait - Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
7	Brazil - Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)	33	Netherlands - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of the Netherlands
8	Brazil - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Brazil	34	Norway - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Norway
9	Canada - Canada Representative Office	35	Norway - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)
10	Canada - Canadian High Commission	36	Norway - Representative Office of Norway
11	Canada - Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	37	Qatar - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Qatar
12	Canada - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Canada	38	Russia - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Russia
13	China - China Development Bank (CDB)	39	Saudi Arabia - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Saudi Arabia
14	China - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of China	40	Saudi Arabia - Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)
15	China - Export - Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank)	41	Spain - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Spain
16	Denmark - Danish International Development Agency (Danida)	42	Spain - Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID)
17	Denmark - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Denmark	43	Sweden - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Sweden
18	Denmark - Representation Office of Denmark	44	Sweden - Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
19	France - Agence Française de Développement (AFD)	45	United Arab Emirates - Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD)
20	France - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of France	46	United Arab Emirates - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of the United Arab Emirates
21	Germany - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of Germany	47	United Kingdom - British High Commission

22	Germany – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	48	United Kingdom - Department for International Development (DFID)
23	Germany – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	49	United Kingdom - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of the United Kingdom
24	Germany - Representative Office of Germany	50	United States - Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
25	India - Embassy (or Consulate - General) of India	51	United States - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
26	India - Export - Import Bank of India (Exim Bank)	52	United States - U.S. Embassy (or Consulate - General)

Note. This table refers to question 22.1.2 of the 2017 LtLS questionnaire. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Prior to fielding the 2017 LtLS, AidData spent nearly two years preparing a sampling frame of around 37,000 host government officials, civil society leaders, and private sector representatives from 126 LMICs. Table 4 lists the inclusion criteria to be addressed by AidData for the 2017 LtLS.

Table 4 Inclusion Criteria for Host Government Officials

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Ministry of Finance/ Economy	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Accountant General, Deputy Accountant General, Head of Department (e.g. Tax, Customs, Budget, Debt Management, Public Procurement, Internal Audit, Public Investment, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis, Public Enterprise Reform)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Government, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Register of participants WB/IMF, ADB, AfDB, and IADB Board of Governor meetings; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; The International Association of Treasury Services (AIST) Conference Records; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Planning/ National Planning Commission	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Director General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Economist, Head of Department (e.g. External Finance and International Cooperation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Policy and Research)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; various Ministry and National Planning Commission websites
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ International Cooperation	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Special Assistant to the Minister, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. North America, Europe, IFIs, United Nations, International Organisations, External Finance, Research and Policy Analysis)	UN General Assembly Conference Records; U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Ministry of Health	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Chief Public Health Officer, Head of Department (e.g. Primary Health Care, Health Systems Reform, Epidemiology and Immunization, Research and Policy Analysis, Monitoring and Evaluation, HIV/AIDS, Malaria); Focal Point for National Health Accounts	Global Fund CCM “Key Contacts”; WHO Ministerial Conference Records; U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Education	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Early Childhood Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Tertiary Education), “Education for All” (EFA) National Coordinator, UNESCO Representative	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; UNESCO Directory of National “Education for All” (EFA) Directors; Participants in High Level Group Meetings on Education For All (HLG5); Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Industry/ Trade/ Commerce/ Competitiveness	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, WTO Accession Focal Point; Head of Department (e.g. Customs, Business Environment Reform Unit); Director of Commerce, Director of Industry	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; WTO National Focal Points, various editions; Participants in Ministerial Conferences on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation; Participants in World Export Development Forum; Participants in International Workshop on Public Private Dialogue; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Ministry of Public Service/ Public Administration	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Membership lists from the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration (UNPAN); the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD); African Management Development Institutes' Network (AMDIN); the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM); Regional School of Public Administration (RESPA); Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) initiative; UN Program for Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (INNOVMED); the Arab Administrative Development Organization (ARADO); Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA); Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD); Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD); The Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP); Red de Líderes de Gobierno Electrónico de América Latina y El Caribe (Red GEALC); various ministry websites
Ministry of Labor/ Social Security/ Social Welfare/ Social Protection	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Natural Resources/Environment	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and Policy Analysis), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Designated National Authority, Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) National Contact, GEF Political Focal Point, GEF Operational Focal Point	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; GEF Political Focal Points and Operational Focal Points; Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) National Contacts; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Designated National Authorities); Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Members of IADB Regional Policy Dialogue; various ministry websites

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Ministry of Energy/ Oil/ Mineral Resources	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, National EITI Focal Point; Member of EITI Steering Committee	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; Participants in IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) annual meetings, various editions; EITI online register of National EITI Focal Points and Steering Committee Members; GEF Political Focal Points and Operational Focal Points; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Lands/ Property Registrar	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department, Property Registrar, Deputy Property Registrar	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes,” various editions; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Doing Business Online Database of Local Partners; UN-HABITAT (United Nations Human Settlements Program) annual conference registration records; various Ministry and Property Registrar websites
Ministry of Justice/ Office of the Attorney General	Minister, Deputy Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisors, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Prosecutor General/Chief Prosecutor, Solicitor General	Membership directory of The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP); Participants in various Third World Summits of Prosecutor Generals, Attorney Generals, and Chief Prosecutors; Ibero-American Association of Prosecutor's Offices; Participants in the Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption; List of participants in International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC); Members of the Ibero-American Legal Assistance Network (IberRed); various Ministry of Justice and Attorney General websites
Ministry of Family/ Gender	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Ministry of Agriculture/ Rural Development/ Land Reform/ Food Security	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Public Works/ Transport	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
Ministry of Interior	Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary General, Special Assistant to the Minister, Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, Head of Department (e.g. Economic and Financial Crimes, Criminal Investigations, Anti-Human Trafficking)	U.S. State Department “Country Background Notes”; CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, various editions; International Who’s Who Publication, various editions; Asian Development Bank’s PPMS Database of Developing Member Country Officials; Africa Confidential’s “Who’s Who” Database; AfDevInfo database; various ministry websites
National Statistical Office	Director General, Deputy Director General, Senior Advisor	International Statistical Institute’s (ISI) Directory of Official Statistical Agencies & Societies; National Statistical Office information from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) website; Managing for Development Results (MFDR) network of experts; statistical experts associated with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); United Nations Statistical Institute for Asia and the Pacific (SIAP); the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21); The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); and Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); various Statistical Office websites

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Investment Promotion Agency	Head of the Agency, Deputy Head of the Agency, Senior Advisor	Membership records from World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA); Participants in the Investment Committee For South East Europe Working Group on Investment Promotion; Participants in various World Export Development Forum meetings; various national investment promotion agency websites
Independent Human Rights Commission/ Office of the Ombudsman	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman, Head of Department	Membership Directory of International Ombudsman Association; Membership records from Network of National Human Rights Institutions, including the Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights Institutions, the Ibero American Federation of the Ombudsman (FIO); OmbudsNet (Sistema Integrado de Información y Comunicación para las oficinas de Ombudsman en América Latina y el Caribe), La Red de Instituciones Nacionales para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos del Continente Americano (Rindhca), and the European Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions; List of Participants in OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meetings; various Human Rights Commission and Ombudsman websites
Independent Electoral Institution	Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Advisor, Director of Elections, Deputy Director of Elections	Members of ACE Electoral Knowledge Network; various election commission websites
Central Bank	Governor, Vice Governor, Head of Operations, Head of Department (e.g. Operations, Research and Policy Analysis) Department, Senior Advisors	Register of participants from WB/IMF, ADB, AfDB, and IADB Board of Governor meetings; Members of the Central Bank Governance Forum; Conference records from annual meetings of the Association of African Central Banks (AACB); Members of Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance Ministries; various central bank websites (from the Bank for International Settlements' "Central Bank Hub")

Overall	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Supreme Audit Institution	Auditor/Inspector General, Deputy Auditor/Inspector General, Comptroller, Head of the Court of Account, Deputy Head of the Court of Account, Member of the Public Accounts Committee, Senior Advisor	Membership list from the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the African Organization of English-Speaking Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAL-E), The Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS), European Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (EUROSAL), South Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (SPASAI), Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (PASAI), The Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), and The Arab Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ARABOSAI); various Supreme Audit Institution websites
Public Procurement Agency	Head of Agency; Deputy Head of Agency, Senior Advisor	The European Public Procurement Network (PPN); Commonwealth Public Procurement Network (CPPN); Asia Pacific Procurement Forum; National Partners of the United Nations Procurement Capacity Development Centre; various public procurement agency websites
Anti-Corruption Agency/ Ministry/ Commission/ Council/ Task Force	Minister, Deputy Minister, Executive Director, Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Adviser, Head of Department (e.g. Investigations, Corruption Prevention and Education, Income and Asset Verification, Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering)	Membership registry of International Association of Anti-Corruption Agencies (IAACA); List of participants in various International Anti-Corruption Conferences (IACC); Participants in Global Forum V on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity; United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Conference Records; Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Review of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption; Participants in ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific; International Center for Asset Recovery Country Profiles; Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAM) National Contact Points; Members of the East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA); National Focal Points for Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO); Members of Research Network of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ANCORAGE-NET); Members of OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies; various anti-corruption institution websites

Source: Custer et al. (2018; Appendix C).

Actors holding the following positions were contacted by AidData and included as representatives of local non-governmental organisations/ civil society organisations for the 2017 LtLS based on the following criteria.

Table 5 Inclusion Criteria for Representatives of Local Civil Society and Non-Government Organisations

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Anti-Corruption and Transparency NGOs	Executive Director, Country Director, Program Manager, and Country Expert	Transparency International Annual Reports; national Transparency International chapter websites; Open Budget Partnership's Country Researchers; Publish What You Fund National Contacts; Open Society Institute (OSI) Directory of Experts; Soros Foundation Directory of Experts; Asia Foundation Directory of Experts
Democracy and Human Rights NGOs (e.g. health, education)	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's (IDEA) NGO Directory; Membership records from Network of National Human Rights Institutions; Membership records of national consortium/ association of NGOs
Social Sector NGOs (e.g. health, education)	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	Global Fund CCM Country websites; Membership records of national consortium/ association of NGOs
Environmental NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Project Director	Environment Encyclopedia and Directory (multiple editions); Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN); GEF and World Bank conference proceedings
Independent Journalist Associations	Executive Director, Secretary General	Country-specific press unions (e.g. Union Des Journalistes Privés Nigériens, Gambia Press Union); CIA Factbook list of "political pressure groups and leaders"; State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
National Coalition/ Consortium/ Association of NGOs	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	CIA Factbook list of "political pressure groups and leaders"; World Association of Non-Governmental Organisations; International Forum of National NGO Platforms; Local Newspapers; country-specific online sources

Source: Custer et al. (2018; Appendix C).

Actors holding the following positions were contacted by AidData and included as representatives of local private sector organisations for the 2017 LtLS based on the following criteria.

Table 6 Inclusion Criteria for Representatives of Local Private Sector Organisations

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	U.S. Commercial Service "Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies"; Local U.S. Chamber of Commerce chapter websites
Western European Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	WB Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; various websites
International Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	International Chamber of Commerce websites
Other International Private Sector Organisations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Various websites
National Chambers of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	WB Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; Participants in International Workshops on Public Private Dialogue
Export-Import Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-specific Export-Import Association Websites
Sectoral Business Associations/ Institutions	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-specific Sectoral Business (e.g. textiles, agriculture, manufacturing)
Finance and Banking Associations/ Institutions	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Finance and Banking Association Websites

Institution	Inclusion Criteria	Sources
Small-/Medium-Sized and Young Entrepreneurs Business Associations	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	Country-Specific Websites for Small-/Medium-Sized and Young Entrepreneurs Business Associations
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	U.S. Commercial Service "Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies"; Local U.S. Chamber of Commerce chapter websites
Western European Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	WB Directory of Private Sector Liaison Officers; various websites
International Chamber of Commerce	Executive Director, Deputy Director, Senior Advisor	International Chamber of Commerce websites

Source: Custer et al. (2018; Appendix C).

3.2 Country case studies

3.2.1 Criteria for the selection of country case studies

1. The model fit of the survey data was good¹ and the regression could be done for both dependent variables (influence on agenda setting and helpfulness in policy implementation).²
2. Countries where a high number of respondents assessed German actors.
3. Countries where all actors of Germany's development cooperation (embassies, GIZ, KfW) received at least one assessment.
4. Countries categorized as A-countries according to the BMZ classification (Doc. 3).
5. Countries covering all regions where A-countries are located (BMZ, 2019), i.e., Asia, Americas, Africa, Europe.

In the course of applying all criteria, some of them showed to be non-sensitive to our data, meaning no countries were excluded based on this data.³ Ultimately, the four countries selected for the country case studies were Albania, Colombia, Cambodia and Malawi.⁴

3.2.2 Questionnaire for interviews in country case studies

As an example, you find the questionnaire for the interviews with governmental officials in Colombia. After an introduction about the DEval, the study, and confidentiality information, the following question were asked.

Development Cooperation in Colombia

1. Can you please tell us briefly about your work with development partners?
2. Can you describe one policy initiative (e.g., reform) in Colombia you are/ were involved in (possibly, a reform in which one or more development partners/ other actors were also involved, in any capacity: providing finance, providing advice, providing technical assistance, etc.)?

Influence on Agenda Setting: All Donors

3. Talking more about this policy initiative, from your perspective, how influential were/ are the development partners you worked with on the decision to pursue this policy initiative/ reform or parts thereof? [Check: With whom did you work?]
4. Can you describe concrete ways how influence occurred?

¹ We selected countries for which the regression predicts donor influence and helpfulness properly, i.e., we checked whether the mean value of a donor that was assessed within a country was located within the range of the mean value +/- 1 SD for all donor assessments within that country – in regard to both dependent variables. If the share of donors that lie within this confidence interval was greater than > 66% (1 SD), we regarded it as a large proportion.

² The rationales for each criteria were as follows: (1) based on regressions with a good model fit and identify countries that were instructive concerning both dependent variables, (2) obtain as much information as possible on Germany, (3) obtain responses concerning all three German actors, (4) select countries where Germany is strongly engaged, (5) include information from various regional contexts. Initially, we also included another criterion, which turned out to be non-binding: available data on small development actors. This was to ideally include information on relevant small donors in the analysis.

³ For example, the initial criterion that Germany should score above/ below or correspond to the predictions of the analysis was not sensitive because all scores were consistent with the prediction (within a standard deviation).

⁴ There are differences between the first survey regression, which enabled us to derive country cases, and the final regression model for the all donor regression: (1) the case study selection was based on regression analysis, which was aggregated on the country level and not based on respondents, (2) the final regression included variables that were identified as meaningful, for instance, in the case studies and not known at the beginning (e.g., pooled funding) 3. Improvements in the model calculations and manifestation of single variables (e.g., aid on budget).

5. Can you classify the donors you worked with in the three categories “lower influence” / “moderate influence” / “higher influence” in terms of influence on the policy agenda?
6. Is/ Was influence in your perspective positive or negative?
7. From your perspective, what factors make donors more or less influential in agenda setting within this policy initiative/ reform? [Check: Can you provide good/ bad practices? Why is this aspect leading to a higher influence from your perception?]

Influence on Agenda Setting: Germany’s Development Cooperation

8. How were your experiences with Germany’s development cooperation (in comparison to other development actors) with regard to influence? [Check: With whom did you cooperate? In case you cooperated several German actors, did they complement each other?]
9. What are strengths and weaknesses of Germany’s development cooperation concerning influence (examples)?
10. Structure of Germany’s development cooperation
 - a. Was it the aim of the BMZ to enable partners to perceive one German Development Cooperation successful? If not, why not?
 - b. Did your perception of Germany’s development cooperation change over time?

Helpfulness in Policy Implementation: All Donors

11. Talking more about this policy initiative, how helpful do you consider the donors you worked with in the implementation of the policy initiative/ reform on the ground?
12. What does “being helpful” mean to you?
13. Can you classify the donors you worked with according to the three categories “lower helpfulness” / “moderate helpfulness” / “higher helpfulness”?
14. Can you describe concrete ways how development partners can be helpful in the implementation of policy initiatives on the ground?
15. What factors make you consider a donor as more or less helpful in the implementation process on the ground? [Check: Can you provide examples of good/ bad practices? Why is this aspect leading to a higher helpfulness in your perception?]

Helpfulness in Policy Implementation: Germany’s Development Cooperation

16. How were your experiences with Germany’s development cooperation (in comparison to other donors) concerning the implementation on the ground?
17. How could Germany’s development cooperation be more helpful in the implementation process on the ground? [Check: Would more KfW/ GIZ staff on the ground make KfW or GIZ more helpful? Would more FA/TA be more helpful?]

Relation between perceptions of development cooperation and outcome of an initiative

18. Do you think this policy initiative has made progress in the last time?
19. How do you identify progress within the initiative?
20. Is progress in the policy/reform influenced by how helpful donors are in the implementation process on the ground or is progress independent of donors?

Finally, the interviewers asked if there were any more questions, said thank you, and informed the interviewees about the further process of the study.

3.3 Detailed methodology for empirical models

Our dependent variables of interest are influence and helpfulness scores, measured on a scale of 1-4 and at the level of the individual survey response⁵, representing a respondent's assessment of the influence and helpfulness of each international donor organisation which he/ she reported receiving advice or assistance from, during the period 2010-2015.

Since our dependent variables are observed for the years 2010-2015, it is important that the independent variables are anchored prior to the outcomes, to enable a cause-and-effect analysis. For example, if a respondent indicates that she held her position in the years 2011-2014, then the respondent evaluates donors' performance during this period, the start year of which is 2011. We attach to such a respondent the values that our independent variables take in the year 2011 (e.g., aid dependence of the respondent's country in the year 2011, or a given donor's CPA in 2011). This approach ensures that the observed outcome (i.e., the influence and helpfulness scores) always occurs after the 'treatment', minimizing risks of endogeneity.⁶

There are two types of independent variables. The first are donor-country dyad variables, tethered to the respondents' start year working in this policy initiative, whenever the data is available, otherwise, measured in year 2010 (the first year of the survey). As such, these variables vary within respondents' countries, policy sectors and stakeholder groups, due to multiple responses in each group. These measures also vary within country-stakeholder- policy-cluster-triad groups whenever there is more than one response in a given country-stakeholder-policy-cluster grouping and the responses evaluated different donors. Furthermore, the variables vary within respondents, since most of respondents evaluated more than one donor.

In the first AidData-DEval report in 2016, the empirical models included a set of controls. However, in such a case, there is a possibility that some control variables might be influenced by the independent variables and cause a selection bias, referred to as a "bad control" variable problem by Angrist and Pischke (2009). Therefore, we use multilevel ordered logit models with increasingly demanding fixed effects to account for any observable or unobservable factors (other than independent variables) that are specific to countries, stakeholders, policy clusters, country-policy cluster-stakeholder-triads or individual respondents and might influence elite opinions of donors.

The second type of independent variables are country-specific, which are also tethered to the respondents' start year working in this policy initiative. As such, these variables vary within respondents' countries, policy sectors and stakeholder groups, due to multiple responses in each group. These variables also vary within donors, since multiple donors are evaluated within each country. Thereby, they also vary within donor-stakeholder-policy-cluster-triad-groups. Although variables vary within countries, whenever respondents held their positions for the different years, this over-time variation is small and hence we do not use country fixed effects. As before, we use multilevel ordered logit models with increasingly demanding fixed effects to account for any observable or unobservable factors (other than independent variables) that are specific to donors, stakeholders, policy clusters, donor-policy-cluster-stakeholder-triads or individual respondents and might influence elite opinions of development partners.

⁵ We use 'response' because a respondent may have worked with three agencies that belong to one bilateral donor (e.g., GIZ, KfW, and the German embassy, all belonging to Germany), and so each agency counts as one response.

⁶ We take the 2010 data reported in the 2016 GPEDC progress report. The caveat with this approach is that for the respondents who worked in 2014-2015, we may assign values that are a bit in the past, and do not exactly reflect the state of affairs at the time the respondents answered. However, we also think that these variables are typically slow to change (i.e., donors do not make sudden changes to their procedures and systems), and so this should be a smaller concern than using data past working experience.

3.4 Categorization of policy cluster

Respondents of the 2017 LtLS selected in which policy domains they worked from a list of 22 policy domains, which were then grouped into broader policy clusters for the analysis (Table 7). The policy cluster in the first joint AidData-DEval study did not always include the same policy domains, e.g. governance covered the aspects public administration, tax, customs, anti-corruption and transparency among others (Faust et al., 2016). Thus, the findings of both studies point in the same direction, but cannot be compared. For the German-specific analysis, we relate the 22 policy domains to BMZ's eleven focus sectors (Table 26).

Table 7 Categorization of policy clusters (2017 LtLS and AidData-DEval II study)


Economic	Environment	Governance	Infrastructure	Rural Development	Social/Health	Others
Finance	Environment and Natural Resource Management	Public Sector Management	Information and Communications Technologies	Rural Development	Human Development and Gender	Foreign Policy
Trade	Energy and Mining	Good Governance and Rule of Law	Urban Development	Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry	Education	
Economic Policy			Water, Sewerage and Waste Management		Nutrition and Food Security	
Private Sector Development			Transportation		Health	
Industry, Trade and Services			Information and Communications Technologies		Social Development and Protection	
					Labor Market Policy and Programs	

Note. The policy domains refer to question 6 of the 2017 LtLS questionnaire (Custer et al., 2018: 83, Appendix E).

4. DONOR PERFORMANCE AS ASSESSED BY PARTNERS

4.1 How do domestic policymakers and practitioners perceive donor support?

Figure 2 Full donor ranking



Note. Light blue = multilateral, dark blue = bilateral; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with $N \geq 30$ and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.92/3.21; number in brackets refers to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average ($p < .05$). Source: 2017 LtLS.

4.2 Operationalisation of independent variables

Table 8 Operationalisation sheet independent variables

Indicator	Definition and calculation	Unit/ data range	Data source	Interpretation
Share of provided aid	Share of CPA coming from a donor in a partner country out of total CPA in that country. To generate this measure, we take the share for every year and anchor it to respondent's start year.	Numeric values between 0 and 1.	OECD's CPA data portal	A higher value indicates a higher relative importance of a donor to a partner country.
Regime type	Country's Polity IV polity2 composite average score anchored to respondent's start year	Numeric values between -10 and 10.	Center for Systemic Peace	A higher value indicates a higher degree of democracy.
Aid fragmentation	Fragmentation ratio: Defined from a partner country's point of view. The aim is to maximize the number of significant donor relations and minimize the number of non-significant relations. On this basis, the fragmentation ratio measures the number of non-significant donors compared to the overall number of donors. The lower the fragmentation ratio, the less fragmented are donors' aid programs in that country. The variable is calculated over each year and anchored to respondent's start year.	Numeric values between 0 and 100.	Data downloaded January 8, 2018 from OECD, 2013.	A higher value indicates more aid fragmentation.
Domestic support	Average number of domestic actors that provided either "A fair amount of support" or "A great deal of support" to policy initiatives according to respondents in a partner country. The 11 domestic actors include: the head of state and/ or government, government ministries and executive agencies, parliament/ the legislature, the judiciary (i.e., the courts), local government, the military, civil society, non-governmental organisations, and faith-based organisations, think tanks and academic institutions, professional associations, labor unions, and student groups, the media, and the private sector.	Numeric values between 0 and 11.	LtLS	A higher value indicates support from a larger number of domestic groups for a particular policy initiative.

Indicator	Definition and calculation	Unit/ data range	Data source	Interpretation
Use of country systems	Percentage of aid for the government sector using country Public Financial Management (PFM) systems across four components: budget execution, financial reporting, auditing and procurement. Data for the year 2010 was assigned to all respondents.	Percentage	OECD's Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, data for the year 2010.	A higher value indicates a higher use of country systems for a given donor.
Predictability	Proportion of aid that is disbursed to a country's government within the fiscal year in which development partners schedule it. Data for the year 2010 was assigned to all respondents.	Percentage	GPEDC Progress Report 2016 (OECD and UNDP, 2016b) ; Table B.5a, column 7, p. 158. Data for the year 2010.	A higher value indicates a higher annual aid predictability for a given donor.
Aid on budget	Proportion of aid for the government sector recorded in the annual budgets of partner countries. Data for the year 2010 was assigned to all respondents.	Percentage	OECD's Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, data for the year 2010.	A higher value indicates a higher share of aid from a given donor that is recorded in annual budgets.
Budget support	Share of ODA in general budget support from a development partner to a given recipient country for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, anchored to respondent's start year. If the respondent started to work in 2014 or 2015, the value for the year 2013 is assigned.	Numeric values between 0 and 1	AidData's Research Release version 3.1, OECD's Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey.	A higher value indicates a higher share of ODA in general budget support, provided by a donor to a recipient country.

Indicator	Definition and calculation	Unit/ data range	Data source	Interpretation
Untied aid	Share of total bilateral aid reported to the OECD DAC that is untied for each donor. Data for the year 2010 was assigned to all respondents.	0-1 for bilaterals; missing data for multilaterals (except for EU). We assign 100% (or 1) to multilaterals, following CGD's QuoDA methodology document 2018 (see CGD, 2018)	GPEDC Progress Report 2016 (OECD and UNDP, 2016b); Table B. 10, column 4. Data for the year 2010 (applies to the year 2009).	A higher value indicates a higher share of untied aid in a donor's total ODA.
ODA from non-DAC donors	Share of ODA that comes from non-DAC development partners for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, anchored to respondent's start year. If the respondent started to work in 2014 or 2015, the value for the year 2013 is assigned.	Numeric values of 0 and 1	AidData Research Release version 3.1	A higher value indicate that a partner country receives a higher share of its ODA from non-DAC sources.
Aid dependency	Net ODA as % of GNI, Recipient country's overall aid dependence for each year, anchored to respondent's start year.	Numeric values, may be <0 or >100, since it measures the net values	WDI	A higher values indicates higher aid dependence of a partner country.
Donor type	Type of donor (bi- vs. multilateral)	bilateral (0); multilateral (1)	LtLS	--
Donor coordination	Share of total ODA disbursed through pooled funding/ Basket Funds in a partner country, anchored to the respondent's start year.	Percentage	CRS	A higher percentage means that a given country has more coordinated donor funding.

Note. The donor-recipient dyad data is from the OECD's Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, accessed for the 2011 round (applicable to 2010). CPA = Country programmable aid. PFM = Public Financial Management. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GNI = Gross National Income. WDI = World Development Indicators, CRS = Creditor Reporting System. For German-specific indicators see Table 33.

4.3 Results of the econometric model

On the next pages we present our results from the econometric models. For detailed information about the methodology used for the empirical models see Chapter 3.2 of the report. We had to reduce font size to assure a better overview of the tables. For each analysis we present the results for both dependent variables (influence on agenda-setting and helpfulness in policy implementation).

4.3.1 Donor specific (dyad) variables

Table 9 presents the results for the donor specific variables. Dyad means that we used data for each donor-partner inter-relationship.

The variables are tethered to the respondents' start year working in this policy initiative, whenever the data is available, otherwise, measured in year 2010 (the first year of the survey).

Table 9 Donor specific (dyad) variables: Influence - Partial Models

Indicators	Donor type			Untied aid			Use of country systems			Aid on budget			Predictability			Donor coordination			Share of provided aid			Budget support		
	1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c	4a	4b	4c	5a	5b	5c	6a	6b	6c	7a	7b	7c	8a	8b	8c
Donor type	0.45 *** (.06)	0.56 *** (.07)	0.20 *** (.02)	0.40 *** (.07)	0.45 *** (.09)	0.16 *** (.03)	0.45 *** (.10)	0.56 *** (.12)	0.18 *** (.04)	0.39 *** (.10)	0.46 *** (.13)	0.16 *** (.04)	0.61 *** (.07)	0.76 *** (.08)	0.27 *** (.02)	0.38 *** (.07)	0.48 *** (.08)	0.17 *** (.03)	0.51 *** (.06)	0.66 *** (.08)	0.22 *** (.02)	0.33 *** (.07)	0.33 *** (.08)	0.16 *** (.03)
Untied aid				-1.18 *** (.23)	-1.48 *** (.26)	-0.41 *** (.08)																		
Use of country systems							-0.02 (.14)	-0.08 (.17)	0.02 (.05)															
Aid on budget										0.54 *** (.15)	0.65 *** (.18)	0.18 *** (.05)												
Predictability													0.89 *** (.23)	1.17 *** (.27)	0.42 *** (.09)									
Donor coordination																0.46 (.45)	0.20 (.48)	0.04 (.13)						
Share of provided aid																			2.80 *** (.31)	3.71 *** (.36)	1.21 *** (.10)			
Budget support																						0.98 *** (.23)	1.34 *** (.26)	0.35 *** (.07)
Country FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Respondent FE	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	7,14 0	7,14 0	7,14 0	5,42 0	5,42 0	5,42 0	2,94 1	2,94 1	2,94 1	2,72 6	2,72 6	2,72 6	5,63 6	5,63 6	5,63 6	5,21 7	5,21 7	5,21 7	5,61 8	5,61 8	5,61 8	5,29 3	5,29 3	5,29 3

Note. All variables are dyad except for donor type and predictability. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country - Policy Cluster – Stakeholder. The coefficient for multilateral was included in the country-donor variables to control for being a multilateral. The effect is positive and significant for both influence and helpfulness in the partial effects regressions. Additional analysis shows that in the case of helpfulness, the loss of significance for the coefficient after we include other variables is due to the smaller sample size.

Table 10 Donor specific (dyad) variables: Influence - Full Models

Indicators	Full models 1			Full models 2		
	1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c
Donor type	0.42* (.25)	0.42 (.34)	0.12 (.11)	0.47** (.21)	0.59** (.29)	0.18* (.09)
Untied Aid	-1.24*** (.37)	-1.85*** (.49)	-0.38*** (.14)	-1.23*** (.25)	-1.80*** (.31)	-0.39*** (.09)
Use of country systems	-0.27 (.21)	-0.36 (.25)	-0.06 (.07)			
Aid on budget	0.48** (.20)	0.71*** (.24)	0.19*** (.06)			
Predictability	0.07 (.63)	-0.03 (.80)	0.09 (.24)	0.51 (.47)	0.61 (.58)	0.25 (.18)
Donor coordination	0.25 (.68)	0.23 (.83)	-0.02 (.21)	0.51 (.48)	0.42 (.57)	0.12 (.14)
Share of provided aid	3.33*** (.60)	4.14*** (.76)	1.23*** (.23)	2.89*** (.46)	3.91*** (.56)	1.29*** (.17)
Budget support	1.16** (.47)	1.28** (.58)	0.34** (.16)	0.96*** (.35)	1.29*** (.43)	0.32*** (.12)
Country FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Respondent FE	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,809	1,809	1,809	2,627	2,627	2,627

Note. Full models 2 are calculated excluding use of country systems and aid on budget because of high inter-correlation between the two variables. All variables are dyad except for donor type and predictability. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. For Predictability, data for 2010 was used.

Table 11 Donor specific (dyad) variables: Helpfulness - Partial Models

	Donor type			Untied aid			Use of country systems			Aid on budget			Predictability			Donor coordination			Share of provided aid			Budget support		
Indicators	1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c	4a	4b	4c	5a	5b	5c	6a	6b	6c	7a	7b	7c	8a	8b	8c
Donor type	0.12 *** (.02)	0.13 *** (.02)	0.13 *** (.02)	0.11 *** (.03)	0.11 *** (.03)	0.12 *** (.03)	0.12 *** (.04)	0.13 *** (.03)	0.13 *** (.03)	0.10 *** (.04)	0.11 *** (.04)	0.11 *** (.04)	0.16 *** (.02)	0.15 *** (.02)	0.16 *** (.02)	0.11 *** (.03)	0.11 *** (.03)	0.12 *** (.03)	0.15 *** (.02)	0.15 *** (.02)	0.16 *** (.02)	0.09 *** (.03)	0.09 *** (.03)	0.11 *** (.03)
Untied aid				-0.19 ** (.09)	-0.18 ** (.09)	-0.19 ** (.09)																		
Use of country systems							0.05 (.05)	-0.00 (.05)	0.00 (.05)															
Aid on budget										0.09 * (.06)	0.10 * (.05)	0.10 ** (.05)												
Predictability													0.27 ** (.11)	0.35 *** (.12)	0.35 *** (.12)									
Donor coordination																0.17 (.16)	-0.04 (.13)	-0.00 (.12)						
Share of provided aid																			0.74 *** (.11)	0.84 *** (.11)	0.94 *** (.10)			
Budget support																						0.07 (.07)	0.13 * (.07)	0.13 * (.07)
Country FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Respondent FE	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	6,526	6,526	6,526	4,996	4,996	4,996	2,730	2,730	2,730	2,525	2,525	2,525	5,174	5,174	5,174	4,791	4,791	4,791	5,150	5,150	5,150	4,840	4,840	4,840

Note. All variables are dyad except for donor type and predictability. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. For Predictability, data for 2010 was used.

Table 12 Donor specific (dyad) variables: Helpfulness - Full Models

Indicators	Full models 1			Full models 2		
	1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c
Donor type	-0.04 (.11)	-0.04 (.10)	0.04 (.10)	0.11 (.08)	0.08 (.07)	0.10 (.08)
Untied aid	-0.18 (.15)	-0.18 (.17)	-0.37** (.16)	-0.19* (.10)	-0.15 (.10)	-0.26*** (.10)
Use of country systems	0.03 (.08)	-0.06 (.07)	-0.04 (.06)			
Aid on budget	0.04 (.07)	0.06 (.07)	0.13** (.06)			
Predictability	-0.11 (.25)	0.14 (.24)	0.13 (.24)	0.10 (.20)	0.28 (.18)	0.31* (.18)
Donor coordination	0.02 (.22)	-0.10 (.17)	-0.08 (.17)	0.27 (.18)	0.03 (.13)	0.10 (.13)
Share of provided aid	0.63*** (.23)	0.46** (.22)	0.56*** (.19)	0.88*** (.17)	0.79*** (.16)	0.86*** (.15)
Budget support	-0.05 (.18)	0.12 (.20)	0.16 (.20)	0.00 (.11)	0.09 (.10)	0.09 (.10)
Country FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
Policy Cluster	✓	X	X	✓	X	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Respondent FE	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Observations	1,643	1,643	1,643	2,395	2,395	2,395

Note. Full models 2 are calculated excluding use of country systems and aid on budget because of high inter-correlation between the two variables. All variables are dyad except for donor type and predictability. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. For Predictability, data for 2010 was used.

Table 13 Donor specific (dyad) variables: Cross-correlations

Indicators	Donor type	Untied aid	Use of country systems	Aid on budget	Predictability	Donor coordination	Share of provided aid	Budget support
Donor type	1							
Untied aid	0.32 ***	1						
Use of country systems	0.15 ***	0.19 ***	1					
Aid on budget	0.24 ***	0.13 ***	0.31 ***	1				
Predictability	-0.04 ***	0.05 ***	0.02	-0.02	1			
Donor coordination	-0.17 ***	0.04 ***	0.14 ***	0.08 ***	-0.11 ***	1		
Share of provided aid	-0.06 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.05 **	0.09 ***	0.09 ***	-0.05 ***	1	
Budget support	0.13 ***	0.10 ***	0.28 ***	0.15 ***	0.08 ***	0.02	0.07 ***	1

Note. All variables are dyad except for donor type and predictability. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$.

4.3.2 Country specific variables

On the next pages we present the results for country specific variables. The country specific variables are tethered to the respondent's start year. We present all partial models as well as full models, followed by the cross-correlations between the variables.

Each analysis was conducted for influence on agenda setting and helpfulness in policy implementation.

Table 14 Country specific variables: Influence - Partial Models

Indicators	Aid dependency		Aid fragmentation		ODA from non-DAC donors		Regime type		Donor coordination		GDP pc		Population	
	1a	1b	2a	2b	3a	3b	4a	4b	5a	5b	6a	6b	7a	7b
Aid dependency	0.00 ** (.00)	0.01 *** (.00)												
Aid fragmentation			-0.00** (.00)	-0.01** (.00)										
ODA from non-DAC donors					0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)								
Regime type							0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)						
Donor coordination									6.74 *** (1.73)	5.40 *** (1.98)				
GDP pc											-0.00 (.03)	-0.06 (.04)		
Population													-0.04 *** (.02)	-0.06 *** (.02)
Donor FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
D-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	6,800	6,800	6,908	6,908	6,824	6,824	6,180	6,180	6,959	6,959	6,927	6,927	7,042	7,042

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. pc = per capita. FE = Fixed Effects. D-PC-S = Donor-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. Data for the respondent's start year was used.

Table 15 Country specific variables: Influence - Full Models

Indicators	Full model 1a	Full model 1b
Aid dependency	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)
Aid fragmentation	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)
ODA from non-DAC donors	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.01)
Regime type	0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.01)
Donor coordination	8.54*** (2.40)	4.63 (2.87)
GDP pc	0.01 (.05)	-0.10* (.06)
Population	-0.03 (.03)	-0.07** (.03)
Donor FE	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X
Donor - Policy Cluster - Stakeholder FE	X	✓
Observations	5,874	5,874

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. pc = per capita. FE = Fixed Effects. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for the respondent's start year was used.

Table 16 Country specific variables: Helpfulness - Partial Models

Indicators	Aid dependency		Aid fragmentation		ODA from non-DAC donors		Regime type		Donor coordination		GDP pc		Population	
	1a	1b	2a	2b	3a	3b	4a	4b	5a	5b	6a	6b	7a	7b
Aid dependency	0.00 (.00)	0.00 ** (.00)												
Aid fragmentation			-0.01 *** (.00)	-0.00 *** (.00)										
ODA from non-DAC donors					0.01 ** (.00)	0.00 (.00)								
Regime type							-0.00 (.01)	-0.00 (.00)						
Donor coordination									5.74 *** (1.48)	2.42 *** (.59)				
GDP pc											-0.14 *** (.03)	-0.07 *** (.01)		
Population													-0.04 *** (.02)	-0.02 ** (.01)
Donor FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
D-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	6,219	6,219	6,330	6,330	6,253	6,253	5,663	5,663	6,362	6,362	6,320	6,320	6,431	6,431

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. pc = per capita. FE = Fixed Effects. D-PC-S = Donor - Policy Cluster - Stakeholder. Data for each respondent's start year was used.

Table 17 Country specific variables: Helpfulness - Full Models

Indicators	Full model 1a	Full model 1b
Aid dependency	-0.01 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)
Aid fragmentation	-0.01*** (.00)	-0.00*** (.00)
ODA from non-DAC donors	0.02*** (.01)	0.01*** (.00)
Regime type	0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.00)
Donor coordination	5.43*** (1.83)	1.73** (.79)
GDP pc	-0.08 (.05)	-0.05*** (.02)
Population	-0.02 (.03)	-0.00 (.01)
Donor FE	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X
Donor - Policy Cluster - Stakeholder FE	X	✓
Observations	5,389	5,389

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. pc = per capita. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for each respondent's start year was used.

Table 18 Country specific variables: Cross-Correlations

Indicators	Aid dependency	Aid fragmentation	ODA from non-DAC donors	Regime type	Donor coordination	GDP pc	Population
Aid dependency	1.00						
Aid fragmentation	-0.02*	1.00					
ODA from non-DAC donors	0.03**	0.11***	1.00				
Regime type	0.06***	0.10***	-0.12***	1.00			
Donor coordination	0.18***	-0.16***	-0.08***	-0.07***	1.00		
GDP pc	-0.40***	0.21***	-0.20***	0.24***	-0.21***	1.00	
Population	-0.28***	0.34***	0.33***	-0.21***	-0.08***	-0.29***	1.00

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. pc = per capita. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for each respondent's start year was used.

4.3.3 Partner-country support variables

On the next pages, we present our findings for partner-country support as described in Chapter 4.2.2. and 5.3.1 of the report.

Table 19 Partner-country support variables: Influence

Indicators	1a	1b	1c	1d	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c
Share of provided aid	2.07*** (.42)	3.19*** (.47)	4.17*** (.52)	1.36*** (.16)	1.83*** (.60)	3.12*** (.65)	4.13*** (.72)			
Regime type	0.00 (.01)	0.19*** (.06)	0.10 (.12)	-0.23 (.20)				0.02 (.01)	0.02 (.05)	0.07 (.08)
Partner-country support					0.08*** (.01)	0.05*** (.02)	0.06** (.03)	0.09*** (.01)	0.04** (.02)	0.16*** (.04)
Provided aid volume* Partner-country support					0.01 (.10)	-0.09 (.10)	-0.12 (.11)			
Regime type* Partner- country support								-0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-0.02** (.01)
Donor FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	X	✓	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	X
C-PC-S FE	X	X	✓	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Respondent FE	X	X	X	✓	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	4,928	4,928	4,928	4,928	5,618	5,618	5,618	6,180	6,180	6,180

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. We sought to see if the effect of CPA differed with different levels of partner-country support for policy initiatives and also if the effect of regime type varied with different levels of partner-country support for policy initiatives. The factor 'partner-country support' is operationalised based on responses to the question "Overall, how much support did this initiative receive from each of the following domestic groups?" in the 2017 LtLS. Since we cannot add respondent-level fixed effects in a model that assesses the effect of partner-country support on perceived donor performance, it is difficult to know if a statistically significant coefficient captures various forms of respondent bias, the actual effect of partner-country support for the initiative, or both.

Table 20 Partner-country support variables: Helpfulness

	1a	1b	1c	1d	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c
Share of provided aid	2.24*** (.54)	2.17*** (.65)	0.94*** (.20)	1.05*** (.20)	2.31*** (.69)	3.77*** (.70)	1.31*** (.21)			
Regime type	0.01 (.01)	0.10** (.04)	0.02 (.02)	0.58** (.24)				-0.08*** (.01)	-0.09** (.04)	-0.03 (.02)
Partner-country support					0.08*** (.01)	0.11*** (.02)	0.02** (.01)	0.03** (.01)	0.03* (.02)	0.02** (.01)
Provided aid volume* Partner-country support					-0.08 (.12)	-0.30** (.12)	-0.09*** (.03)			
Regime type*Partner- country support								0.01*** (.00)	0.01*** (.00)	-0.00 (.00)
Donor FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	X	✓	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	✓	X	X	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	X
C-PC-S FE	X	X	✓	X	X	X	✓	X	X	✓
Respondent FE	X	X	X	✓	X	X	X	X	X	X
Observations	4,533	4,533	4,533	4,533	5,150	5,150	5,150	5,663	5,663	5,663

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. We sought to see if the effect of regime type differed with different levels of partner-country support for policy initiatives.

4.3.4 Additional Tables

Table 21 Additional Tables: All variables (Results to be interpreted with caution)

Indicators	(1) Influence	(2) Helpfulness
Untied aid	-0.88** (.40)	-0.24 (.36)
Use of country systems	-0.10 (.19)	0.06 (.20)
Aid on budget	0.09 (.17)	-0.07 (.18)
Predictability	0.04 (.63)	-0.24 (.77)
Donor coordination	0.40 (.59)	-0.30 (.72)
Share of provided aid	2.17*** (.79)	0.69 (.92)
Budget support	1.58*** (.43)	0.55 (.49)
Aid dependency	0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)
Aid fragmentation	-0.00 (.01)	-0.03*** (.01)
ODA from non-DAC donors	0.01 (.01)	0.02* (.01)
Regime type	0.03 (.02)	0.05** (.02)
GDP pc	-0.07 (.11)	-0.18* (.11)
Population	-0.05 (.06)	-0.01 (.06)
Partner-country support	0.10*** (.02)	0.10*** (.02)
Stakeholder FE	✓	✓
Policy Cluster	✓	✓
Observations	1,643	1,495

Note. All variables are dyad except for donor type and predictability. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. ODA = Official Development Assistance. DAC = Development Assistance Committee. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. pc = per capita. FE = Fixed Effects. For predictability, data for 2010 was used.

Table 22 Additional Tables: Partner-country support (results to be interpreted with caution)

Indicators	(1) Infl.	(2) Infl.	(3) Helpf.	(4) Helpf.
Partner-country support	0.06*** (.01)	0.10*** (.02)	0.08*** (.01)	0.02*** (.01)
Donor FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X
Policy Cluster	✓	X	✓	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	7,140	7,140	6,526	6,526

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder.

Table 23 Additional Tables: Donor type and predictability in the small sample size: Influence (Results to be interpreted with caution)

Indicators	(1)	(2)	(3)
Donor type	0.07 (.26)	-0.06 (.35)	-0.01 (.11)
Predictability	-0.88 (.59)	-1.24 (.76)	-0.19 (.24)
Country FE	✓	X	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	X
Policy Cluster	✓	X	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X
Respondent FE	X	X	✓
Observations	1,809	1,809	1,809

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder.
For Predictability, data for 2010 was used.

Table 24 Additional Tables: Donor type and predictability in the small sample size: Helpfulness (Results to be interpreted with caution)

Indicators	(1)	(2)	(3)
Donor type	-0.24 (.31)	-0.06 (.10)	-0.01 (.11)
Predictability	-0.52 (.69)	0.06 (.23)	0.01 (.23)
Country FE	✓	X	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	X
Policy Cluster	✓	X	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X
Respondent FE	X	X	✓
Observations	1,612	1,612	1,612

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder. For Predictability, data for 2010 was used.

5. GERMANY'S PERFORMANCE AS ASSESSED BY PARTNERS

5.1 Germany's reach and performance in A-, B- and C-countries

Table 25 A- and B-countries according to the BMZ classification

Region	Bilateral cooperation country programs	
	A- Countries (up to three policy areas)	B- Countries (one policy area)
Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam	Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Transnational cooperation Central Asia (including Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan)
Southeast Europe/ Caucasus	Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Ukraine	Bosnia-Herzegovina, Caucasus Initiative (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), Moldova
Latin America and Caribbean	Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru	Caribbean Program (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba), Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay
Middle East	Palestinian territories, Yemen	Iraq*, Jordan, Lebanon*, Syria
Africa	Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia	Algeria, Central African Republic*, Chad, Libya*, Madagascar, Nigeria, Program Fragile States of West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea), Senegal, Somalia*, Tunisia

Note. *Countries with temporary cooperation as part of long-term structure-building measures. Source: Doc. 3; BMZ, 2019.

First, we analyse whether perceived support reflects the varying intensity of Germany's engagement in partner countries. Since visibility is a first step to being perceived as influential or helpful (or not), we consider two hypotheses. The first is that a larger share of respondents in A-countries report that Germany provided their government or their team with advice or assistance, i.e., a higher reported reach in A-countries compared to B-countries, and a higher reach in B-countries compared to C-countries. The second is that Germany is perceived as more influential and helpful in A-countries compared to B, and in B-countries compared to C-countries. For all other donors, we do not expect the scores to follow any specific pattern.

In line with our first hypothesis, Germany is more visible in A-countries, as a higher share of respondents reported receiving advice or assistance (35 percent), here, compared to B-countries (27 percent) and C-countries (12 percent). We also find support for our second hypothesis if we look at perceived performance: Germany has higher influence and helpfulness scores in A-countries, followed by B- and then C-countries.⁷

⁷ This is not always the case for each of the three German agencies. For instance, GIZ is more influential in A- compared to C-countries, but it is the reverse for KfW. Note that the difference-in-means is not significant for A- vs. B-countries, but is in the case of A- vs. C-countries at $p < 0.10$ level.

In contrast, all donors (excluding Germany) get the highest influence and helpfulness scores in C-countries compared to A- and B-countries (see Figure 4).⁸ This finding suggests that Germany may be reaping a higher performance dividend in A- and B-countries where it prioritizes its engagement.⁹

Since this section focuses on Germany's performance and its comparative advantage vis-à-vis other donors, we restrict the remaining analysis on German actors' performance to A- and B-countries only.¹⁰


The difference in means is calculated based on weighted means across the country groups. This is different from the means presented in the figures, which are calculated at the donor level, taking simple averages to be consistent with our approach in Chapter 4.

⁸ While the absolute difference in scores is marginal, it is interesting that this trend is unique to Germany: looking at the cohort of bilaterals (excluding Germany), we do not find a similar decrease in influence/ helpfulness scores in moving from A- to B- to C-countries.


⁹ Note that the difference in mean scores for Germany's influence and helpfulness in A-and B- vs. C-countries is significant only at $p < 0.15$. No information can be added to this from the qualitative findings, as case studies were only conducted in A-countries.

¹⁰ We recognize that other donors may have different priority countries, which may affect how they perform in Germany's priority countries. However, the focus of this section is on Germany's comparative performance in its priority countries. This implies that we do not consider other donors' priority countries in our analysis as well as Germany's priorities. The difference in mean scores for all development partners (excluding Germany) in A- vs. C-countries is also statistically significant, indicating that all other development partners perform worse in A- compared to C-countries.

Figure 3 Perceived influence and helpfulness in A-/ B-, and C-countries



Note. Dark blue/orange = A-countries, medium blue/yellow = B-countries, light blue/light yellow = C-countries. Numbers in brackets refer to the number of donors in a given cohort that the simple average is based on; for Germany, numbers in brackets are the total number of assessments across the three German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/helpful, 3 = quite influential/helpful, 4 = very influential/helpful. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 4 Perceived influence and helpfulness agency-level cohort with all donors' average

Note. Light blue = multilateral, dark blue = bilateral, orange = Germany/German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/helpful, 3 = quite influential/helpful, 4 = very influential/helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all cohort agencies' average scores with $N \geq 30$ excluding German agencies and dividing them by the total number of cohort agencies), average influence/helpfulness = 2.99/3.20; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average ($p < .05$). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Respondents of the 2017 LtLS selected among a list of 22 policy domains in which they had worked. For the German-specific analysis, we mapped the 22 policy domains to BMZ's 11 focus sectors (see Table 26). What could not be mapped was included in the 'other' category, which we do not report in this study.

Table 26 Policy domains: LtLS 2017 - BMZ

BMZ Sectors	2017 LtLS
Democracy, Civil Society, Public Administration (includes human rights, judicial reform, decentralization, communal development)	(14) Good Governance and Rule of Law
	(15) Public Sector Management
	(22) Foreign Policy
	(8) Human Development and Gender
	(17) 1-8 Social Development and Protection
Peace Building and Conflict Prevention (includes strengthening the potential for peace, reconciliation, demobilization)	(17) 9-10 Social Development and Protection
Education (without vocational education)	(3) Education
Health	(7) Health
Drinking Water, Water Management, Sewerage, and Waste Management	(21) Water, Sewerage and Waste Management
Food Security, Agriculture (including fishing)	(1) Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry
	(12) Nutrition and Food Security
Environmental Policy, Protection and Sustainable Use of Natural Resources (Desertification, Soil Fertility, Sustainable Forest Management, Biodiversity)	(5) Environment and Natural Resource Management
Sustainable Economic Development (economic policy advice, private sector development, financial system, vocational training and labor market)	(2) Economic Policy
	(6) Finance
	(11) Labor Market Policy and Programs
	(13) Private Sector Development
	(9) Industry, Trade and Services
(18) Trade	
Energy (includes energy efficiency and renewable energies)	(4) Energy and Mining
Transportation and Communications	(19) Transportation
	(10) Information and Communications Technologies
Urban and Rural Development	(16) Rural development
	(20) Urban development


Note. The numeration of the policy domains (right column) refers to the areas of policymaking in question 6 of the 2017 LtLS questionnaire.

5.2 Germany's perceived influence and helpfulness across stakeholder groups, policy areas and regions in A- and B-countries

Below, figures on all policy clusters, regions and stakeholder groups are presented. When we disaggregate the responses by respondents' region, stakeholder group and policy cluster, the number of responses drops below 30 for several donors, which makes it difficult to draw comparisons at these disaggregated levels. Therefore, for this finding, we reduce our minimum threshold from 30 to 15, and only show those figures where Germany can be compared with at least five other donors that received at least 15 assessments. The average is calculated based on the five (or more) donors (excluding Germany) that meet the $N \geq 15$ threshold. We exclude Germany from the average. We look at whether a given German actor's score is different from this average, but only if this actor received more than 30 evaluations. This is to ensure that a reasonable number of assessments supports our finding.


5.2.1 Germany's perceived influence and helpfulness across regions

Figure 5 Perceived influence and helpfulness "East Asia and Pacific"




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with $N \geq 30$ and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.88/ 3.09; numbers in bracket refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average ($p < .05$). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 6 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Europe/ Central Asia”




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.96/ 3.10; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 7 Perceived influence and helpfulness “South Asia”




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.89/ 2.94; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 8 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Sub-Saharan Africa"




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.10/ 3.39; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 9 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Latin America and the Caribbean"



Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.98/ 3.16; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.


Figure 10 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Middle East and North Africa"



Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.18/ 3.13; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.


5.2.2 Germany's perceived influence and helpfulness across stakeholder groups

Figure 11 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Governmental officials"




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.01/ 3.24; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 12 Perceived influence and helpfulness “NGOs and CSOs”



Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.88/ 3.05; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.


Figure 13 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Private Sector”



Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.39/ 3.36; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals* indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.


5.2.3 Germany's perceived influence and helpfulness across policy clusters

Figure 14 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Democracy, Civil Society and Public Administration”




Note. Scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful. Blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 15 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.15/ 3.26. Numbers in brackets refer to responses. Grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Figure shows all development actors of the peer group with more than 30 responses, thus, China (influence: 3.00 [15], helpfulness: 3.28 [11]) and KfW (influence: 3.08 [20], helpfulness: 3.33 [19]) are not included. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 15 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Sustainable Economic Development”




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.00/ 3.27; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 16 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Health”




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.17/ 3.37; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 17 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Education”




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 3.08/ 3.30; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals. Source: 2017 LtLS.


Figure 18 Perceived influence and helpfulness “Environmental Policy”




Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; blue dotted line = average (summing up all donors' average scores with N ≥ 30 and dividing them by the total number of donors), average influence/ helpfulness = 2.87/ 3.35; numbers in brackets refer to responses; grey lines = 95% confidence intervals, * indicates a significantly different donor score from the peer group average (p < .05). Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 19 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Water"


Note. Orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; no average calculation, as less than 5 DPs in the cohort with $N \geq 15$; numbers in brackets refer to responses. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 20 Influence and helpfulness "Energy"


Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; no average calculation, as less than 5 DPs in the cohort with $N \geq 15$; numbers in brackets refer to responses. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 21 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Food Security and Agriculture"

Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; no average calculation, as less than 5 DPs in the cohort with $N \geq 15$; numbers in brackets refer to responses. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 22 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Transportation and Communications"

Note. Orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; no average calculation, as less than 5 DPs in the cohort with $N \geq 15$; numbers in brackets refer to responses. Source: 2017 LtLS.

Figure 23 Perceived influence and helpfulness "Urban and Rural Development"

Note. Dark blue = bilateral and multilateral, orange = Germany/ German actors; scale: 1 = not at all influential/ helpful, 2 = only slightly influential/ helpful, 3 = quite influential/ helpful, 4 = very influential/ helpful; no average calculation, as less than 5 DPs in the cohort with $N \geq 15$; numbers in brackets refer to responses. Source: 2017 LtLS.

For the policy cluster "Peace Building and Conflict Prevention" (includes strengthening the potential for peace, reconciliation, demobilization) there was no data available for Germany, GIZ, KfW and the embassies.

5.3 German reforms: Detailed methodology and results

We address the question whether recent reforms have an effect on local policy-makers' and practitioners' perceptions about Germany's influence and helpfulness by using four approaches.

As a first step, we compare the ranking of donors using the 2014 RES and the 2017 LtLS. We only include the donors that were listed in both surveys and received at least 30 respondents' assessments.¹¹ We find that Germany maintains the 18th position (out of 30 donors) concerning influence; but moves up four places concerning helpfulness (from 19th to 15th position, out of 28 donors; see Table 27). However, since the years

¹¹ This gives us 30 donors in the case of influence and 28 in the case of helpfulness. Custer et al. (2018: 34–35) also present such a ranking comparison, however, this includes responses from donor staff. Here we use a pure domestic group that includes government officials, private sector representatives and NGO/CSO leaders.

2010-2013 are included in both surveys, we do not have distinct time periods that cover pre- and post-reforms. Moreover, this does not tell us anything about whether Germany improved its performance overtime in absolute terms (i.e., vis-à-vis itself).

Table 27 Changes in ranking from RES 2014 and LtLS 2017

Influence in agenda setting				Helpfulness in implementation					
RES 2014 Ranking		LtLS 2017 Ranking		Net change	RES 2014 Ranking		LtLS 2017 Ranking		Net change
1	World Bank (1,643)	1	IMF (218)	+1	1	IMF (502)	1	UNICEF (229)	+6
2	IMF (683)	2	World Bank (575)	-1	2	World Bank (1,461)	2	Global Fund (110)	+3
3	EU (1,402)	3	USA (684)	+6	3	GEF (32)	3	IMF (199)	-2
4	IADB (251)	4	EU (588)	-1	4	Denmark (78)	4	World Bank (549)	-2
5	ADB (380)	5	UK (267)	+11	5	Global Fund (52)	5	USA (630)	+7
6	UNDP (1,438)	6	UNICEF (249)	+2	6	IADB (193)	6	EU (564)	+3
7	Denmark (113)	7	Denmark (133)	0	7	UNICEF (441)	7	AfDB (165)	+8
8	UNICEF (715)	8	Global Fund (119)	+4	8	Sweden (147)	8	IADB (80)	-2
9	USA (2,447)	9	UNDP (516)	-3	9	EU (1,082)	9	China (92)	+18
10	GEF (65)	10	EBRD (56)	+5	10	ADB (283)	10	UK (250)	+6
11	Sweden (244)	11	IADB (81)	-7	11	NL (114)	11	UNDP (484)	+3
12	Global Fund (80)	12	AfDB (169)	+2	12	USA (1,529)	12	France (188)	+12
13	NL (159)	13	ADB (130)	-8	13	EBRD (86)	13	GEF (118)	-10
14	AfDB (492)	14	Norway (179)	+5	14	UNDP (1,024)	14	Sweden (170)	-6
15	EBRD (159)	15	Sweden (184)	-4	15	AfDB (359)	15	Germany (473)	+4
16	UK (1,077)	16	China (112)	+10	16	UK (602)	16	Denmark (123)	-12
17	IFAD (42)	17	NL (141)	-4	17	Belgium (95)	17	Australia (198)	+1
18	Germany (1,458)	18	Germany (516)	0	18	Australia (256)	18	Canada (209)	+7
19	Norway (165)	19	GEF (135)	-9	19	Germany (767)	19	India (43)	+9
20	Australia (527)	20	India (53)	+9	20	Norway (92)	20	IsDB (52)	+3
21	Belgium (191)	21	Japan (401)	+3	21	Spain (145)	21	Spain (54)	0

Influence in agenda setting				Helpfulness in implementation					
22	Spain (312)	22	Australia (217)	-2	22	Japan (550)	22	Japan (337)	0
23	France (865)	23	France (209)	0	23	IsDB (68)	23	Belgium (85)	-6
24	Japan (1,236)	24	Belgium (95)	-3	24	France (400)	24	Norway (162)	-4
25	Canada (811)	25	IsDB (57)	+3	25	Canada (333)	25	ADB (120)	-15
26	China (511)	26	IFAD (99)	-9	26	Brazil (53)	26	NL (125)	-15
27	Brazil (218)	27	Canada (228)	-2	27	China (140)	27	EBRD (45)	-14
28	IsDB (173)	28	Kuwait (34)	+2	28	India (48)	28	Brazil (30)	-2
29	India (218)	29	Spain (59)	-7					
30	Kuwait (143)	30	Brazil (37)	-3					

Source: Custer et al (2018: 34f.).

To overcome the limitations of the first approach, we divide the respondents to the 2017 LtLS into two cohorts: a pre-reform cohort, comprising respondents that held their position in 2010 or/ and 2011 only, and a post-reform cohort, comprising respondents who held their position only in the years 2012-2015 (any combination of these years).¹²

The central idea is to see if respondents that worked in the post-reform period evaluated Germany differently from those that worked pre-reforms.¹³

Since we do not observe the same respondents during the pre- and post-reform years, we cannot fully control for respondent-specific characteristics, which could drive the differences in the evaluations. However, we are able to include country, policy cluster and stakeholder fixed effects, which we believe account for most variation among respondents, thus, any remaining variation would be related to time-variant factors. That said, we acknowledge that other dynamics in Germany's Development Cooperation (apart from the reforms) could affect Germany's perceptions as a donor. For instance, the budget of the BMZ has nearly doubled between 2005 and now. Additionally, changes in Germany's governments in 2009 and 2013 could also affect the overall strategies and approaches, such as BMZ's Special Initiatives which may ultimately affect its perceptions. Thus, the effect we estimate here is not exclusive to the German reforms, but captures other time-varying changes that are likely to have as much of an effect on perceptions as the reforms themselves.

Respondents who worked during the period following the reforms and who evaluated Germany tend to assign lower scores compared to respondents who worked prior to the reforms. The inclusion of more demanding fixed effects takes out that significance, though the dummy variable remains negative (see Table 28). To find out whether there are unobservable time-variant factors, which could have negatively affected all donors, we conduct a similar regression analysis for respondents who evaluated bilateral donors other than Germany. We find no significant differences in their perceptions of bilateral donors (see Table 29).

¹² The respondents who worked in the period covering both pre- and post-reform years are not included in the regression analysis, since it is not clear from the survey to which year their assessments refer.

¹³ The empirical specification includes perceived influence/ helpfulness as a dependent variable and a reform_dummy as the independent variable, which is equal to one if a respondent worked after the reforms, and is equal to zero for respondents who worked prior to reforms.

Table 28 Evaluation of German agencies

	(1) Influence	(2) Influence	(3) Helpfulness	(4) Helpfulness
Reform dummy	-1.13** (.57)	-2.42 (2.03)	-1.51*** (.56)	-0.32 (.53)
Country FE	✓	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	220	220	203	203

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder.

Table 29 Evaluation of bilateral agencies, excluding Germany

	(1) Influence	(2) Influence	(3) Helpfulness	(4) Helpfulness
Reform dummy	-0.07 (.18)	0.29 (.33)	-0.24 (.21)	-0.04 (.14)
Country FE	✓	X	✓	X
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X
Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X
C-PC-S FE	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	1,261	1,481	1,116	1,319

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. C-PC-S = Country-Policy Cluster-Stakeholder.

In the third approach, we use data from both survey rounds – the 2014 RES (covering the period 2004-2013) and the 2017 LtLS (covering the period 2010-2015) – on the perceived influence and helpfulness of donors. Our goal is to compare the evaluation scores of Germany in both surveys. However, this is not straightforward due to three key differences in the surveys.

First, the two surveys provided respondents with different scales to evaluate donors' influence and helpfulness¹⁴, which implies the need to recalibrate scores to allow for comparison. Second, the focus of the 2014 RES was on government reform efforts, and the role of donors in terms of (a) their influence in the design of these efforts (agenda setting) and (b) their helpfulness in the implementation of these efforts. In contrast, the 2017 LtLS was about policy initiatives (not limited to those of the government) and the role of donors in terms of (a) their influence on the decision to pursue certain policy initiatives (agenda setting) and

¹⁴ In the 2014 RES, influence is measured on a scale of 0-5 where 0 means no influence and 5 is maximum influence, while in the 2017 LtLS influence is measured on a scale of 1-4 with response options defined as: 1 = not at all influential, 2 = only slightly influential, 3 = quite influential, 4 = very influential.

(b) helpfulness in policy implementation.¹⁵ This difference in framing and exact wording of the questions concerning influence and helpfulness implies that the results are not strictly comparable.

To account for the different numeric scales in the response options to the question on influence and helpfulness, we standardize each respondent's raw score as a Z-score, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. To account for other changes between the two waves (including changes in wording), we make use of the fact that the periods covered by the two surveys overlap (i.e., 2010-2013), and calculate the average Z-scores for each survey. The difference obtained in the average Z-score between the two survey waves is attributed to differences in the surveys (e.g., differences in question wording, in the way respondents interpret the survey question, in the cohort of donors, etc.), and also to the differences between respondents.

We conduct a longitudinal comparison between the two waves: taking the period 2004-2011 (pre-reform) from the 2014 RES and the period 2012-2015 (post-reform) from the 2017 LtLS. We calculate the difference in the average Z-scores between pre- and post-reform cohorts and then adjust it by netting out the difference obtained in the comparison of the overlapping period. By doing so, we largely account for scoring differences that are merely due to changes in the design of the questionnaire.

The adjusted differences in the average Z-scores of influence between the two surveys show that Germany received lower scores in the post-reform period (Table 30). However, this is not unique to Germany, since the average scores of bilateral partners also decreased. The adjusted differences in the average Z-scores of helpfulness between the two surveys show that Germany scored higher in post-reform period, while the average score of other bilateral partners has decreased.

Table 30 Pre-post-reform analysis RES 2014 + LtLS 2017

	Influence					Helpfulness				
	Pre-reform (2004-11)	Post- reform (2012-15)	z-score diff	z-score overlap	Adjusted z-score diff	Pre-reform (2004-11)	Post- reform (2012-15)	z-score diff	z-score overlap	Adjusted z-score diff
Bilateral donors	-0.22 [10,297]	-0.09 [3,474]	0.13	0.15	-0.03	-0.13 [4,909]	0.09 [3,125]	0.07	0.08	-0.01
Germany	-0.12 [1,397]	-0.13 [607]	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.12 [740]	-0.12 [555]	0.00	-0.01	0.02

Finally, we supplement these three quantitative approaches with insights from our country case studies regarding the perceived changes following the German reforms. Overall, not many interview partners worked with Germany's development cooperation in both the pre- and post-reform periods. Among those, who did, domestic decision-makers do not perceive major changes in the degree of influence and helpfulness after the reforms, except the change in name (GTZ vs. GIZ) and a reduced number of agencies they interact with.

¹⁵ The question in the 2014 RES was: How much influence did each of the donors have on the design of the government's [selected issue area] reform efforts. The question in the 2017 LtLS was: How influential were [selected donors] on the government's or your team's decision to pursue [selected initiative]? A related difference is that in the 2014 RES, every respondent (no matter which stakeholder group she belonged to) answered with respect to the government's reform efforts. In the 2017 LtLS, the question answered by a government official had 'government', but for other groups, this was changed to 'your team'.

Table 31 Influence and Helpfulness pre- and post-German aid reforms, A- and B-countries

	Influence			Helpfulness		
	RES 2014 (2010-13)	LtLS 2017 (2010-13)	z-score diff	RES 2014 (2010-13)	LtLS 2017 (2010-1)	z-score diff
All donors	0.00 [13,499]	0.07 [7,459]	0.06	0.02 [7,847]	0.04 [6,845]	0.02
Multilateral Organisations	0.26 [6,179]	0.18 [3,969]	-0.08	0.14 [4,370]	0.11 [3,703]	-0.03
Bilateral donors	-0.22 [7,320]	-0.07 [3,490]	0.15	-0.13 [3,477]	-0.05 [3,142]	0.08
Germany's development cooperation	-0.13 [1,019]	-0.11 [598]	0.02	-0.12 [531]	-0.12 [549]	-0.01

As Table 32 shows the distribution of respondents. Overall, there were enough respondents in the pre-reform period to adequately conduct a pre-post-reform comparison.

Table 32 Distribution of responses across respondents' start year

Year	Frequency	Percent
2010	5,261	55.99
2011	1,139	12.12
2012	1,076	11.45
2013	1,008	10.73
2014	579	6.16
2015	334	3.55
TOTAL	9,397	100.00

5.4 Operationalization of German-specific independent variables

Table 33 German-specific operationalization sheet independent variables

Indicator	Definition and calculation	Unit/ data range	Interpretation	Data source
State fragility	Scores are assigned to every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators, anchored to each respondent's start year.	Integer values of 0 or greater.	A higher value indicates greater fragility or instability.	Center for Systematic Peace
Intensity of BMZ's official development cooperation	Bilateral governmental development cooperation of BMZ; three dummy variables for each level of cooperation.	A_country dummy = bilateral country program; B_country dummy = regional or thematic country cooperation; C_country (reference group) = no cooperation	A_country dummy indicates a stronger cooperation program.	Doc. 3
Implementing agencies	German embassies, GIZ, KfW; two dummy variables	embassies (0); GIZ or KfW (1)	A higher value indicates the performance of the implementing organisation in comparison to the embassies.	LtLS 2017, AidData
Number of Germany's offices abroad	The number of offices per country with a spatial presence for the years 2011-2015. In case there are more offices, e.g. project offices at another location in the country, these are counted as several offices, in case there are several offices in one city, these count as one. If an expert is working within a partner institution, ('Entwicklungshelfer*innen' and 'CIM-specialists') this does not count as office. No data available for 2010. Thus, data from 2011 was used for 2010.	# representations	A higher value indicates higher number of representations.	GIZ database

Indicator	Definition and calculation	Unit/ data range	Interpretation	Data source
Number of GIZ staff abroad	Number of GIZ staff in partner countries in the years 2011-2015 (data includes: entsandte LZFK = posted national long-term experts, nationale LZFK = national long-term experts, internationale LZFK = international long-term experts, EHs = development workers, IFs = integrated experts). No data for 2010 available. Thus, data from 2011 was used for 2010.	# persons	A higher value indicates more staff.	GIZ database
Number of KfW staff abroad	Number of KfW staff in partner countries in the years 2011-2015. No data for 2010 available. Thus, data from 2011 was used for 2010.	# persons	A higher value indicates more staff.	KfW database
Number of BMZ staff seconded to embassies	Number of BMZ staff seconded to the German embassies in partner countries in the years 2010-2015.	# persons	A higher value indicates more staff.	BMZ database
Relevance of development projects	Average score of all KfW/ GIZ internal evaluations for relevance (based on 2006 DAC criteria). The calculation as described below results in one score for each partner country, the score refers to evaluations of projects between 2010 and 2015. This mean score was applied to every year. The variable was constructed using data from GIZ and KfW internal evaluations, where a score for relevance was given. Relevance is based on the evaluation criteria of BMZ of 2006, based on the DAC criteria. Guiding questions: (i) Aiming to solve a key developmental problem of the target group(s). (ii) Coinciding with that of the partner country and does it address a key developmental problem bottleneck in the partner country. (iii) Consistency with the objectives and guidelines of the BMZ. (iv) Corresponding to today's standards, knowledge and framework conditions.	1 = highest grade to 4 = lowest grade	The lower the relevance score, the higher the perceived performance.	DEval database

Indicator	Definition and calculation	Unit/ data range	Interpretation	Data source
	<p>For the mean calculation for each country, for different types of evaluations (conducted during different stages of the project), different years of publishing of the evaluations were considered to approach the time frame of the LtLS:</p> <p>(i) GIZ PFK, PEV, end: 07/2009 to 12/2015 (ii) GIZ ex-post: 01/2012 to 12/2018 (iii) KfW ex-post: 01/2013 to 12/2018</p> <p>The mean score for 2010-2015 was calculated and applied to all respective survey years, due to the small number of cases per year and country.</p>			
Duration of cooperation	We subtract the start year of respondents' reported working experience from the start year of German ODA to a country (earliest 1960).	0 to 59	A higher value indicates a longer duration of Germany's cooperation in a partner country.	CRS data
Donor coordination	Country was part of the EUs Joint Programming strategy in which Germany was involved, per country and year.	No (0); Yes (1)	Yes means coordination of European development partners in a country, used as a proxy for harmonization.	BMZ

Note. WDI = World Development Indicators, CRS = Creditor Reporting System. Donor coordination was operationalized as EU joint programming in the German-specific models.

	Aid fragmentation		Partner-country support		Donor coordination		Relevance of projects		Provided aid volume		Intensity of cooperation		Embassies vs. GIZ/KfW	
Donor coordination					0.05 (.26)	-0.10 (.41)								
Relevance of projects							0.58* (.32)	0.72* (.40)						
Share of provided aid									-3.74 (3.90)	-5.35 (3.81)				
Intensity of cooperation											0.38 (.55)	0.32 (.52)		
Embassies vs GIZ													-0.16 (.25)	-0.28 (.25)
Embassies vs KfW													0.10 (.30)	-0.11 (.31)
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
BMZ Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region-Stakeholder-Policy FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	505	505	516	516	512	512	465	465	486	486	516	516	516	516

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for each year was used except for partner-country support, relevance of projects and provided aid volume. Provided aid volume is a dyad variable. Donor coordination was tested in the German-specific models by operationalizing it as EU joint programming.

Table 35 Full Models Influence

	Full model 1		Full model 2		Full model 3		Full model 4	
	1a	1b	2a	2b	3a	3b	4a	4b
Regime type	0.02 (.03)	0.03 (.04)	0.03 (.03)	0.02 (.04)	0.02 (.03)	0.02 (.04)	0.03 (.03)	0.02 (.04)
Aid dependency	-0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	-0.01 (.01)
State fragility	0.08* (.05)	0.04 (.06)	0.06 (.04)	0.05 (.05)	0.06* (.04)	0.04 (.05)	0.06* (.04)	0.04 (.05)
Duration of cooperation	0.02 (.02)	0.03 (.03)	0.02 (.02)	0.03 (.03)	0.02 (.02)	0.03 (.03)	0.02 (.02)	0.03 (.03)
KfW staff size	0.05 (.10)	-0.09 (.15)						
GIZ staff size			0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)				
GIZ number of offices							0.02 (.06)	0.11 (.08)
Number of BMZ staff seconded to embassies					-0.13 (.20)	-0.35 (.24)		
Aid fragmentation	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.02)	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.02)	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.02)	-0.01 (.01)	0.00 (.02)
Partner-country support	0.05 (.05)	0.11* (.06)	0.05 (.05)	0.12* (.06)	0.05 (.05)	0.12* (.06)	0.05 (.05)	0.12* (.06)
Donor coordination	0.58 (.51)	0.90* (.53)	0.76 (.51)	0.98* (.54)	0.52 (.51)	0.84 (.53)	0.58 (.51)	1.00* (.54)
Relevance of projects	1.18*** (.43)	1.56*** (.53)	1.22*** (.41)	1.62*** (.53)	1.14*** (.43)	1.54*** (.53)	1.17*** (.42)	1.68*** (.53)
Share of provided aid	0.78 (6.11)	-4.42 (5.47)	1.59 (5.83)	-3.14 (5.64)	0.59 (5.92)	-4.09 (5.32)	0.46 (6.15)	-3.48 (5.47)
Total CPA	-0.00 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.01)	0.01 (.01)
Population	-0.22 (.27)	-0.30 (.24)	-0.20 (.19)	-0.31 (.23)	-0.19 (.26)	-0.30 (.23)	-0.21 (.28)	-0.41* (.24)
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
BMZ Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region-Stakeholder-Policy FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for each year was used except for partner-country support, relevance of projects and provided aid volume. Provided aid volume is a dyad variable. Donor coordination was tested in the German-specific models by operationalizing it as EU joint programming. Due to missing values, the indicators intensity of cooperation, embassies vs GIZ and embassies vs KfW were removed.

Indicators	Aid fragmentation		Partner-country support		Donor coordination		Relevance of projects		Provided aid volume		Intensity of cooperation		Embassies vs. GIZ/ KfW	
	9a	9b	10a	10b	11a	11b	12a	12b	13a	13b	16a	16b	17a	17b
Regime type														
Aid dependency														
State fragility														
Duration of cooperation														
KfW staff size														
GIZ staff size														
GIZ number of offices														
Number of BMZ staff seconded to embassies														
Aid fragmentation	-0.01 (.01)	-0.00 (.00)												
Partner-country support			0.08* (.04)	0.03 (.02)										
Donor coordination					0.26 (.56)	-0.02 (.20)								
Relevance of projects							0.21 (.30)	0.12 (.12)						
Share of provided aid									-2.00 (2.15)	-0.37 (1.03)				
Intensity of cooperation											0.35 (.51)	0.24 (.17)		
Embassies vs GIZ													0.42 (.26)	0.20** (.09)
Embassies vs KfW													1.02*** (.31)	0.40*** (.11)
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
BMZ Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region-Stakeholder-Policy FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	464	464	473	473	468	468	426	426	444	444	473	473	473	473

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for each year was used except for partner-country support, relevance of projects and provided aid volume. Provided aid volume is a dyad variable. Donor coordination was tested in the German-specific models by operationalizing it as EU joint programming.

Table 37 Full Models - Helpfulness

	Full model 1		Full model 2		Full model 3		Full model 4	
Indicators	1a	1b	2a	2b	3a	3b	4a	4b
Regime type	0.02 (.03)	-0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.03)	-0.02 (.01)	0.02 (.03)	-0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.03)	-0.02 (.01)
Aid dependency	-0.03** (.01)	-0.01** (.00)	-0.03** (.01)	-0.01 (.00)	-0.04*** (.01)	-0.01** (.00)	-0.03** (.01)	-0.01 (.00)
State fragility	0.06 (.05)	-0.00 (.02)	0.08* (.05)	0.01 (.02)	0.08* (.04)	0.01 (.02)	0.08* (.04)	0.01 (.02)
Duration of cooperation	0.01 (.02)	0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.02)	-0.00 (.01)	0.01 (.02)	-0.00 (.01)	0.00 (.02)	-0.00 (.01)
KfW staff size	1405 (.09)	-0.07* (.04)						
GIZ staff size			-0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)				
GIZ number of offices							-0.00 (.07)	0.00 (.03)
Number of BMZ staff seconded to embassies					-0.48** (.22)	-0.20** (.09)		
Aid fragmentation	-0.03** (.02)	-0.01** (.01)	-0.03* (.02)	-0.01* (.01)	-0.03* (.02)	0.01* (.01)	-0.03* (.02)	-0.01* (.01)
Partner-country support	0.07 (.05)	0.01 (.02)	0.08 (.05)	0.02 (.02)	0.07 (.05)	0.01 (.02)	0.08 (.05)	0.02 (.02)
Donor coordination	0.15 (.69)	-0.03 (.21)	0.20 (.80)	0.01 (.26)	0.11 (.64)	-0.06 (.20)	0.20 (.77)	-0.00 (.24)
Relevance of projects	0.27 (.40)	0.23 (.16)	0.28 (.40)	0.23 (.16)	0.23 (.40)	0.22 (.16)	0.28 (.40)	0.23 (.16)
Share of provided aid	-4.30 (3.80)	-2.65* (1.37)	-3.85 (3.82)	-2.34 (1.51)	-3.57 (3.54)	-2.32* (1.35)	-3.84 (3.74)	-2.45* (1.47)
Total CPA	-0.01 (.00)	0.00** (.00)	0.01 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	0.01* (.00)	0.00** (.00)	-0.01 (.00)	0.00 (.00)

	Full model 1		Full model 2		Full model 3		Full model 4	
Population	-0.29 (.20)	-0.15* (.08)	-0.33* (.19)	-0.15* (.08)	-0.33* (.19)	-0.15* (.08)	-0.33 (.20)	-0.15* (.08)
Stakeholder FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
BMZ Policy Cluster FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region FE	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X
Region-Stakeholder-Policy FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Observations	366	366	366	366	366	366	366	366

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. FE = Fixed Effects. Data for each year was used except for partner-country support, relevance of projects and provided aid volume. Provided aid volume is a dyad variable. Donor coordination was tested in the German-specific models by operationalizing it as EU joint programming. Due to missing values, the indicators intensity of cooperation, embassies vs GIZ and embassies vs KfW were removed.

Table 38 Main Tables: Cross-correlations

	Regime type	Aid dependency	State fragility	Duration of cooperation	KfW staff size	GIZ staff size	GIZ number of offices	Number of BMZ staff seconded to embassies	Aid fragmentation	Partner-country support	Donor coordination	Relevance of projects	Provided aid volume	Untied aid	Use of country systems	Donor coordination
Regime type	1															
Aid dependency	0.06	1														
State fragility	-0.39***	0.50***	1													
Duration of cooperation	-0.33***	0.18***	0.61***	1												
KfW staff size	0.11**	0.04	-0.10**	-0.10**	1											
GIZ staff size	-0.19***	0.46***	0.48***	0.24***	0.55***	1										
GIZ number of offices	-0.17***	0.21***	0.47***	0.34***	0.33***	0.62***	1									
Number of BMZ staff seconded to embassies	-0.10**	-0.05	0.17***	0.28***	0.59***	0.32***	0.42***	1								
Aid fragmentation	0.18***	-0.04	-0.14***	-0.07	0.37***	0.25***	0.04	0.15***	1							
Partner-country support	-0.06	0.20***	0.15***	0.17***	-0.09**	0	0.03	0.02	-0.08*	1						
Donor coordination	-0.11**	0.04	0.12***	0.16***	-0.11***	-0.05	-0.01	0.04	-0.21***	-0.05	1					
Relevance of projects	0.05	0.26***	0.15***	0.14***	-0.06	0.02	0.02	0.10**	-0.22***	0.08*	0.21***	1				
Share of provided aid	0.19***	-0.02	-0.37***	-0.27***	0.36***	0.05	0	0.14***	0.18***	-0.07*	-0.12***	0.03	1			
Untied aid	-0.08	-0.42***	-0.42***	0.03	-0.24***	-0.64***	-0.24***	0.04	-0.11**	-0.08*	0.02	0.01	0.04	1		
Use of country systems	0.08	0.17***	-0.18***	-0.08	0.19***	-0.11**	-0.08	-0.04	0.13***	0.03	0.08*	0.02	0.19***	0.04	1	
Donor coordination	-0.04	0.13***	0.23***	0.22***	0.10**	0.04	0.17***	0.26***	-0.15***	0.10**	0.12***	0.22***	-0.12***	0.02	0.13***	1

Note. * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$. Data for each year was used except for partner-country support, relevance of projects and provided aid volume. Provided aid volume, untied aid and use of country systems are dyad variables. Donor coordination was tested in the German-specific models by operationalizing it as EU joint programming.

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